COVID-19 Tracking in China

The document examines how the Chinese government utilizes digital tools, specifically 'Health Kit' apps and the 'Green Arrow' travel app, to implement its 'zero-COVID' strategy. It details the role of private tech companies like Alibaba and Tencent in providing the infrastructure for this surveillance, noting that these platforms collect precise location and personal data that is accessible to the central government. The brief describes a system of color-coded health statuses (green, yellow, red) that controls movement and access to public spaces in major cities like Beijing and Shanghai, effectively enabling mass electronic surveillance and the ability to 'ground' citizens in their homes via automated alerts.

• China's 'zero-COVID' policy relies on smartphone 'Health Kit' apps that enable unprecedented mass surveillance of citizens in major cities, requiring residents to show a 'green' status to access public spaces or services.
• The health tracking system uses a three-color scheme to regulate movement: green allows access, yellow indicates contact with a case or visit to a risk area (resulting in isolation), and red signifies a positive test, leading to immediate mandatory hospitalization and isolation.
• The Chinese government utilizes a three-stage screening process to identify contacts of positive cases, moving from self-reported information to real-time app data and finally to 14-day historical tracking data.
• Private technology companies, including Alibaba (DingTalk, Alipay) and Tencent (WeChat), provide the essential digital infrastructure for tracking, and are legally required to share all generated data with the central government of the People's Republic of China.
• The 'Communication Big Data Travel Card' (Green Arrow app) tracks movements across administrative boundaries by aggregating data from WeChat payments, check-in scans, and cell phone tower signals from the previous seven days.
• Automated pop-up alerts based on geolocation and payment history can effectively 'ground' citizens, preventing them from entering monitored locations or boarding flights and trains if they have visited high-risk areas.

APA

Kolås, Å. (2022). COVID-19 Tracking in China. Peace Research Institute Oslo. https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/99f6e060-0702-49ba-bc3f-798a98280beb/Kolas - COVID-19 Tracking in China PRIO Policy Brief 6-2022.pdf?inline=true

Chicago

Kolås, Åshild. COVID-19 Tracking in China. Peace Research Institute Oslo, 2022. https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/99f6e060-0702-49ba-bc3f-798a98280beb/Kolas - COVID-19 Tracking in China PRIO Policy Brief 6-2022.pdf?inline=true.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Kolås |first1=Åshild |title=COVID-19 Tracking in China |publisher=Peace Research Institute Oslo |date=June 2022 |url=https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/99f6e060-0702-49ba-bc3f-798a98280beb/Kolas - COVID-19 Tracking in China PRIO Policy Brief 6-2022.pdf?inline=true |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{kols2022covid19, author = {Kolås, Åshild}, title = {{COVID-19 Tracking in China}}, institution = {Peace Research Institute Oslo}, year = {2022}, month = jun, url = {https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/99f6e060-0702-49ba-bc3f-798a98280beb/Kolas - COVID-19 Tracking in China PRIO Policy Brief 6-2022.pdf?inline=true}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }