Peace From the Bottom-Up?

The Afghan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP), launched in late 2010, has achieved limited results due to rushed implementation, poor coordination, and the absence of a coherent political strategy. While designed to entice low-level insurgents with security and jobs, the program has struggled with slow fund disbursement, inadequate vetting, and a failure to provide genuine security for reintegrees. A significant portion of those reintegrated are from northern and western provinces and may not be genuine insurgents. Furthermore, the tendency to enroll reintegrees in the Afghan Local Police (ALP) may exacerbate local rivalries rather than foster peace. The author argues that reintegration cannot succeed as a standalone military tool and must be embedded in a broader reconciliation process that addresses high-level leadership and systemic grievances.

• The APRP has shown limited results in its first ten months due to rushed implementation, poor internal coordination, and a lack of a comprehensive political approach.
• Financial disbursement for the program has been extremely slow; by the end of May 2011, the Afghan government had spent only $7.7 million of the $133.4 million in committed funds it had received.
• There is significant ambiguity regarding the identity of reintegrees, with approximately 85% of reintegration occurring in northern and western provinces where many participants appear to be peripheral to the insurgency or unrelated groups.
• Security provision for reintegrees is failing, leaving them vulnerable to Taliban revenge attacks and, in some cases, accidental targeting or arrest by international and Afghan forces.
• The program lacks a detailed and officially circulated amnesty policy, which is described by officials as a highly sensitive 'Pandora’s box'.
• Due to a lack of civilian jobs and security, many reintegrees have been enrolled in the Afghan Local Police (ALP), which may intensify local rivalries and maintain armed groups in the country.
• A fundamental division exists between the Afghan government, which viewed reintegration as accompanying high-level talks, and ISAF, which saw it as a military strategy to force insurgent leaders to the table.
• Active insurgent commanders, particularly in Helmand and Baghlan, generally express no interest in reintegration unless their high-level leadership is involved in negotiations with the government.

APA

Derksen, D. (n.d.). Peace From the Bottom-Up? Peace Research Institute Oslo. https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/5e58940d-cad6-47ef-a163-457e154172cd/Derksen 2011 Peace From the Bottom-Up PRIO Paper.pdf?inline=true

Chicago

Derksen, Deedee. Peace From the Bottom-Up? Peace Research Institute Oslo, n.d. https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/5e58940d-cad6-47ef-a163-457e154172cd/Derksen 2011 Peace From the Bottom-Up PRIO Paper.pdf?inline=true.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Derksen |first1=Deedee |title=Peace From the Bottom-Up? |publisher=Peace Research Institute Oslo |url=https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/5e58940d-cad6-47ef-a163-457e154172cd/Derksen 2011 Peace From the Bottom-Up PRIO Paper.pdf?inline=true |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{derksenndpeace, author = {Derksen, Deedee}, title = {{Peace From the Bottom-Up?}}, institution = {Peace Research Institute Oslo}, url = {https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/5e58940d-cad6-47ef-a163-457e154172cd/Derksen 2011 Peace From the Bottom-Up PRIO Paper.pdf?inline=true}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }