Coercion, Co-optation, or Cooperation? State Capacity and the Risk of Civil War, 19612004

The research evaluates three dimensions of state capacity—coercion (revenue extraction), co-optation (government spending), and cooperation (trust in institutions)—to determine their impact on the onset of civil war. Using a global dataset, the authors find that high government spending and trustworthy institutions (proxied by contract-intensive money) are significant predictors of civil peace, whereas coercive capacity (relative political capacity) has little predictive power when controlling for other factors. The findings suggest that civil peace is co-produced through social cooperation and the provision of public goods rather than through state repression.

• High levels of government spending and trustworthy institutions are more significant predictors of civil peace than a state's coercive capacities.
• The state's capacity for revenue extraction, used as a proxy for coercive capacity (Relative Political Capacity), shows no significant relationship with the risk of civil conflict onset when control variables are included.
• Increased government expenditure relative to GDP is associated with a reduced risk of armed conflict; for example, shifting from the 5th to the 95th percentile of spending (approx. 7% to 27% of GDP) almost halves the annual predicted probability of conflict from 3.1% to 1.7%.
• Trust in state institutions, proxied by Contract Intensive Money (CIM), significantly reduces the risk of civil war. Increasing CIM from the 5th to the 95th percentile reduces the annual predicted probability of onset by 54% (from 4.1% to 1.9%).
• The pacifying effect of government expenditure is strengthened in political systems with high levels of executive constraints, suggesting that the provision of public goods is more critical for peace than private rent-seeking.
• The traditional correlation between high GDP per capita and civil peace may be largely explained by the presence of good institutions (CIM), as GDP per capita loses statistical significance when CIM is included in the model.
• Control variables consistent with previous research were found: more populous countries, semi-democratic regimes, and oil-exporting countries generally face a higher risk of civil conflict.

APA

Fjelde, H., & de Soysa, I. (n.d.). Coercion, Co-optation, or Cooperation? State Capacity and the Risk of Civil War, 19612004. Peace Research Institute Oslo. https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/34c24c46-0f3c-40ff-8317-c03f17c354d9/Coercion Co-optation or Cooperation State Capacity and the Risk of Civil War 1961-2004.pdf?inline=true

Chicago

Fjelde, Hanne, and Indra de Soysa. Coercion, Co-optation, or Cooperation? State Capacity and the Risk of Civil War, 19612004. Peace Research Institute Oslo, n.d. https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/34c24c46-0f3c-40ff-8317-c03f17c354d9/Coercion Co-optation or Cooperation State Capacity and the Risk of Civil War 1961-2004.pdf?inline=true.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Fjelde |first1=Hanne |last2=de Soysa |first2=Indra |title=Coercion, Co-optation, or Cooperation? State Capacity and the Risk of Civil War, 19612004 |publisher=Peace Research Institute Oslo |url=https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/34c24c46-0f3c-40ff-8317-c03f17c354d9/Coercion Co-optation or Cooperation State Capacity and the Risk of Civil War 1961-2004.pdf?inline=true |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{fjeldendcoercion, author = {Fjelde, Hanne and de Soysa, Indra}, title = {{Coercion, Co-optation, or Cooperation? State Capacity and the Risk of Civil War, 19612004}}, institution = {Peace Research Institute Oslo}, url = {https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/34c24c46-0f3c-40ff-8317-c03f17c354d9/Coercion Co-optation or Cooperation State Capacity and the Risk of Civil War 1961-2004.pdf?inline=true}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }