Dual-Use AI Technology in China, the US and the EU
Summary
The report examines how AI, as a dual-use technology, is being integrated into military capabilities and regulated through export controls in China, the US, and the EU. It highlights China's 'military-civil fusion' strategy and the US's efforts to maintain technological leadership, while the EU focuses on ethical standards and 'trustworthy AI'. The authors argue that the intangibility of software makes trade controls difficult and that the competition for AI dominance creates a 'dual-use security dilemma' that could destabilize strategic relations and nuclear deterrence.
Key insights
- Regulating dual-use AI is uniquely challenging because software is intangible, making it easy to transfer across borders and difficult for customs officials to monitor or verify.
- China employs a 'military-civil fusion' strategy to integrate private sector innovation into military programs, aiming to achieve 'brain supremacy' on the battlefield.
- The US strategy focuses on protecting its technological leadership and restricting the flow of data and talent to competitors, specifically China and Russia.
- The EU prioritizes a 'human-centric' approach to AI, emphasizing the creation of 'trustworthy AI' based on ethical standards, transparency, and fairness.
- The competition for dual-use AI may lead to a 'dual-use security dilemma,' where civilian technological progress is perceived as a military threat, increasing mistrust and the risk of miscalculation.
- AI applications could destabilize nuclear deterrence by enhancing capabilities in remote sensing, missile defense, and autonomous nuclear weapon delivery.
- China's top-down approach to AI development faces internal inefficiencies, including overinvestment in areas without market demand and a shortage of experienced algorithm developers.
- Russia's development of military AI is heavily dependent on importing dual-use technology, particularly advanced semiconductors, due to a lack of domestic infrastructure and skilled scientists.
Cite the original document
- APA
- Carrozza, I., Marsh, N., & Reichberg, G. M. (2022). Dual-Use AI Technology in China, the US and the EU. Peace Research Institute Oslo. https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/6c0dc6db-c6b3-44a4-b775-126ff97588b4/Carrozza Marsh Reichberg - Dual-Use AI Technology in China the US and the EU - Strategic Implications for the Balance of Power PRIO Paper 2022.pdf?inline=true
- Chicago
- Carrozza, Ilaria, Nicholas Marsh, and Gregory M. Reichberg. Dual-Use AI Technology in China, the US and the EU. Peace Research Institute Oslo, 2022. https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/6c0dc6db-c6b3-44a4-b775-126ff97588b4/Carrozza Marsh Reichberg - Dual-Use AI Technology in China the US and the EU - Strategic Implications for the Balance of Power PRIO Paper 2022.pdf?inline=true.
- Wikipedia
- {{cite report |last1=Carrozza |first1=Ilaria |last2=Marsh |first2=Nicholas |last3=Reichberg |first3=Gregory M. |title=Dual-Use AI Technology in China, the US and the EU |publisher=Peace Research Institute Oslo |date=2022 |url=https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/6c0dc6db-c6b3-44a4-b775-126ff97588b4/Carrozza Marsh Reichberg - Dual-Use AI Technology in China the US and the EU - Strategic Implications for the Balance of Power PRIO Paper 2022.pdf?inline=true |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
- BibTeX
- @techreport{carrozza2022dualuse, author = {Carrozza, Ilaria and Marsh, Nicholas and Reichberg, Gregory M.}, title = {{Dual-Use AI Technology in China, the US and the EU}}, institution = {Peace Research Institute Oslo}, year = {2022}, url = {https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/6c0dc6db-c6b3-44a4-b775-126ff97588b4/Carrozza Marsh Reichberg - Dual-Use AI Technology in China the US and the EU - Strategic Implications for the Balance of Power PRIO Paper 2022.pdf?inline=true}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }
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