two-worlds-nagoya-d3558083ea2502ea.pdf

This December 2016 report by Natural Justice and Public Eye analyzes discrepancies between the European Union's Access and Benefit-Sharing (ABS) regulation and the national legislations of provider countries implementing the Nagoya Protocol. The authors argue that the EU's narrow scope regarding temporal triggers, the definition of associated traditional knowledge, and the 'import loophole' creates legal uncertainty and undermines fair benefit sharing.

• The EU ABS Regulation triggers benefit-sharing obligations based on the physical access to genetic resources (GR) or associated traditional knowledge (aTK) in the country of origin, rather than their utilization. This limits obligations to resources accessed after the Nagoya Protocol was ratified by both the EU and the provider country, effectively excluding resources accessed prior to this date even if new research and development occurs.
• Most provider countries define the trigger for benefit sharing as the utilization of GR and aTK, regardless of when physical access occurred. Examples include Brazil, Zambia, and Bhutan, where legislation defines access to include research, technological development, or use, including resources held in ex-situ collections.
• The EU regulation restricts the scope of associated traditional knowledge (aTK) to only that which is explicitly described in the Mutually Agreed Terms (MAT) of an access agreement. This definition makes it nearly impossible to track the illegal use of aTK where no such agreement exists, contradicting broader definitions used in provider countries like Kenya, Zambia, and South Africa.
• An 'import loophole' exists in the EU framework because due diligence is only required from users conducting research and development within the EU. Parties that develop products based on GR and aTK outside the EU and then import those products for commercialization within the EU are not covered by the regulation.
• The EU's 'register of collections' system may inadvertently facilitate the circumvention of provider country laws. Because the EU regulation does not apply to resources accessed before the Nagoya Protocol, collections can supply such materials to commercial users without requiring new Prior Informed Consent (PIC) or MAT, even if the provider country's own laws require them for new uses.
• The discrepancies between EU and provider country laws create legal uncertainty for European users, who may be compliant with EU law but in breach of the provider country's national laws. This conflict may lead provider countries to implement more restrictive access measures, potentially hindering the overall goal of the Nagoya Protocol to facilitate access.
• To mitigate these gaps, the report suggests that provider countries should explicitly include utilization as the trigger for ABS obligations in their national laws and ensure that Mutually Agreed Terms (MAT) prohibit the transfer of resources to third parties without authorization.

APA

Natural Justice (n.d.). two-worlds-nagoya-d3558083ea2502ea.pdf. https://naturaljustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Two-worlds-Nagoya.pdf

Chicago

Natural Justice. two-worlds-nagoya-d3558083ea2502ea.pdf. n.d. https://naturaljustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Two-worlds-Nagoya.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |author=Natural Justice |title=two-worlds-nagoya-d3558083ea2502ea.pdf |url=https://naturaljustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Two-worlds-Nagoya.pdf |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{naturaljusticendtwoworldsnagoyad3558083ea2502eapdf, author = {{Natural Justice}}, title = {{two-worlds-nagoya-d3558083ea2502ea.pdf}}, institution = {Natural Justice}, url = {https://naturaljustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Two-worlds-Nagoya.pdf}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }