Somalia: Fourteenth time lucky?

The paper examines the recurring failure of peace processes in Somalia, highlighting the role of warlords, clan dynamics, and the influence of regional powers like Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti. It details the transition from the Siyad Barre regime to a collapsed state, the relative stability of Somaliland and Puntland, and the specific outcomes of the Arta process and the Eldoret/Mbagathi conferences. The author argues that the 'violent veto' of faction leaders and the divergent interests of international mediators continue to undermine the establishment of a stable national government.

• The process of rebuilding the Somali state has been characterized by repeated failures, with the author noting that by 2004, there had been approximately fourteen attempts to reconstruct the state, many of which were undermined by warlords who possess the "power of violent veto".
• The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) serves as a facilitator rather than a driver of the peace process, and its effectiveness is hampered by the fact that the frontline states involvedKenya, Ethiopia, and Djiboutihave their own internal and regional interests and ethnic Somali populations, making neutrality difficult.
• Somaliland and Puntland achieved greater stability than southern Somalia by utilizing low-cost, local clan-based peace initiatives and the authority of lineage elders, contrasting with the high-profile, internationally sponsored conferences in the south.
• The Arta process in 2000, initiated by Djibouti, attempted to include civil society and resulted in a Transitional National Charter and the election of Abdikassim Salad Hassan as president, but it failed to secure the participation of Somaliland, Puntland, and several prominent Mogadishu faction leaders.
• The National Reconciliation Conference that began in Eldoret in 2002 and later moved to Mbagathi adopted a "4.5 Formula" for representation, allocating equal seats to the four major clan families (Hawiye, Darod, Rahanweyn, and Dir) and a smaller share to minority clans.
• Despite reaching a consensus on a transitional national charter in January 2004, the agreement was immediately threatened as nearly half of the signatories reneged, claiming the text had been altered without consent.
• The international community's role is complicated by a reluctance to engage in disarmament due to the high volume of weapons in the country and the US's cautious approach following previous failed interventions and its focus on counter-terrorism proxies.

APA

Cornwell, R. (2004). Somalia: Fourteenth time lucky? Institute for Security Studies. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/PAPER87.PDF

Chicago

Cornwell, Richard. Somalia: Fourteenth time lucky? Institute for Security Studies, 2004. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/PAPER87.PDF.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Cornwell |first1=Richard |title=Somalia: Fourteenth time lucky? |publisher=Institute for Security Studies |date=April 2004 |url=https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/PAPER87.PDF |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{cornwell2004somalia, author = {Cornwell, Richard}, title = {{Somalia: Fourteenth time lucky?}}, institution = {Institute for Security Studies}, year = {2004}, month = apr, url = {https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/PAPER87.PDF}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }