Cape Town’s underworld

The paper applies second-generation social network analysis to map a criminal network centered on security racketeering in Cape Town's central business district. By analyzing 112 nodes and 224 interactions based on media reports from 2010 to 2013, the study identifies a highly centralized network where a small number of 'grey' agents—individuals operating across both lawful and unlawful sectors—exercise significant control. The analysis highlights that the network's operation relies more on lawful economic interactions, such as business investments and employment, than on overt violence, posing significant challenges for traditional law enforcement.

• The criminal network in Cape Town's central business district is highly centralized, with a small number of actors controlling the majority of the network's routes. Radovan Krejcir and Cyril Beeka together intervened in 44.5% of the network's geodesic routes.
• The network operates with a high degree of sophistication, primarily utilizing lawful economic interactions to achieve criminal goals rather than relying on violence. Lawful economic interactions constitute the largest category of interactions at 54%.
• The network is composed of 'grey' nodes—actors who operate within both lawful social structures and unlawful criminal networks. Businessmen represent the largest category of actors at 24% of the 112 analyzed nodes.
• Cyril Beeka established a successful protection racket in the Cape Town CBD starting in the 1990s, using a group known as the 'Moroccans' to create instability in venues that did not pay his subscription rates.
• Following Beeka's murder in 2011, Specialised Protection Services (SPS) was formed to monopolize the CBD protection industry through extortion and the amalgamation of former rivals, though it was later shut down for failing to register with the Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority.
• The study argues that traditional police activity and the prosecution of 'dark' criminal nodes are insufficient to dismantle such networks because of their integration into lawful economic sectors, necessitating the use of financial intelligence units.

APA

Salcedo-Albaran, E., Goga, K., & Goredema, C. (2014). Cape Town’s underworld. Institute for Security Studies. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/Paper270V2.pdf

Chicago

Salcedo-Albaran, Eduardo, Khalil Goga, and Charles Goredema. Cape Town’s underworld. Institute for Security Studies, 2014. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/Paper270V2.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Salcedo-Albaran |first1=Eduardo |last2=Goga |first2=Khalil |last3=Goredema |first3=Charles |title=Cape Town’s underworld |publisher=Institute for Security Studies |date=November 2014 |url=https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/Paper270V2.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{salcedoalbaran2014cape, author = {Salcedo-Albaran, Eduardo and Goga, Khalil and Goredema, Charles}, title = {{Cape Town’s underworld}}, institution = {Institute for Security Studies}, year = {2014}, month = nov, url = {https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/Paper270V2.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }