The anti-human smuggling business and Libya’s political end game

The report argues that the decline in migrant arrivals from Libya in late 2017 resulted from the co-option of smuggling militias by international donors, primarily Italy. This 'anti-smuggling business' allows militia leaders to launder their reputations to avoid international sanctions and position themselves for a future political settlement. However, the authors contend that this strategy creates instability, as seen in the violent conflict in Sabratha, and risks worsening the abuse of migrants. The report advocates for a 'stability first' approach focused on genuine disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) rather than indiscriminate partnerships with armed groups.

• The dramatic reduction in migrant arrivals in the Central Mediterranean during the second half of 2017 is attributed to the co-option of militias previously involved in human smuggling, encouraged by Italy's 'cash-for-migration-control' strategy.
• Militia leaders are transitioning from smuggling to anti-smuggling activities to 'launder' their reputations and avoid liabilities such as International Criminal Court (ICC) indictments or asset seizures as Libya approaches a potential political settlement.
• Italy's strategy involved a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Libya's Government of National Accord (GNA) in February 2017, providing training, equipment, and development aid in exchange for improved border security and migration control.
• The co-option of specific militias has triggered violent local conflicts, exemplified by the battle for Sabratha in September and October 2017, where the al-Wadi Battalion fought the Anas al-Dabbashi Battalion, resulting in over 40 deaths and the displacement of more than 15,000 people.
• The human smuggling industry in Libya is deeply interdependent with other illicit trades, particularly fuel smuggling, which remains the most lucrative financial backbone of the west coast's illicit economy.
• The report argues that co-opting militias is not equivalent to genuine disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR), as it legitimises warlords while allowing them to retain their organisational structures and stakes in the illicit economy.
• The authors suggest that the focus on stemming migration flows may inadvertently increase the abuse of migrants, as smugglers may find alternative ways to monetise migrants through forced labour and extortion in detention centres.
• The report recommends a 'stability first' doctrine where the UN leads the political process and international actors focus on security sector reform and the fight against fuel smuggling to gain domestic legitimacy.

APA

Micallef, M., & Reitano, T. (2017). The anti-human smuggling business and Libya’s political end game. Institute for Security Studies. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/nar2.pdf

Chicago

Micallef, Mark, and Tuesday Reitano. The anti-human smuggling business and Libya’s political end game. Institute for Security Studies, 2017. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/nar2.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Micallef |first1=Mark |last2=Reitano |first2=Tuesday |title=The anti-human smuggling business and Libya’s political end game |publisher=Institute for Security Studies |date=December 2017 |url=https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/nar2.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{micallef2017antihuman, author = {Micallef, Mark and Reitano, Tuesday}, title = {{The anti-human smuggling business and Libya’s political end game}}, institution = {Institute for Security Studies}, year = {2017}, month = dec, url = {https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/nar2.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }