Commissioners and commanders

The monograph analyzes the systemic and leadership failures within the South African Police Service (SAPS) that led to the killing of 34 striking miners at the Lonmin Marikana mine. It identifies two critical shifts in the police response: the nationalization of the operation on 13 August and the decision on 15 August to launch a tactical intervention. The author argues that the operation was characterized by a blurring of command lines, the marginalization of Public Order Police (POP) expertise, and a reckless disregard for the risk of bloodshed. The document highlights how political pressure from the Minister of Police and elite interests influenced senior leaders who lacked operational experience, leading to a rudimentary tactical plan that violated the 'McCann principle' of minimizing lethal force.

• The Marikana Commission found that while some police may have believed they were under attack at Scene 1, many SAPS members likely 'exceeded the bounds of self and private defence' by failing to use the minimum amount of force reasonable in the circumstances.
• A critical shift occurred on 13 August 2012, when the operation became a hybrid national-provincial effort, resulting in the marginalization of Public Order Police (POP) commanders from the leadership structure.
• The decision to launch the tactical intervention on 16 August was made on Wednesday, 15 August, and was likely a directive from National Commissioner Phiyega under the guidance of Minister of Police Nathi Mthethwa.
• The SAPS leadership, specifically Provincial Commissioner Mbombo and National Commissioner Phiyega, lacked the necessary training, skills, and operational experience to manage the complex situation at Marikana.
• The tactical plan presented for the 16 August intervention was rudimentary, lacked a detailed written format, and was briefed to commanders using a single Google Earth diagram on a laptop.
• SAPS commanders, including Mbombo, Mpembe, and Annandale, were aware that the intervention was likely to result in bloodshed, yet they proceeded without substantive measures to mitigate the loss of life.
• The SAPS failed to apply the 'McCann principle', which requires commanders to plan operations in a way that minimizes the risk of using lethal force, instead relying on the situational common-law principle of private defence.
• The command structure at Marikana was ambiguous, with Major General Annandale acting as the de facto commander of tactical units while Lieutenant General Mbombo exercised direct, interventionist authority over the overall operation.
• SAPS negotiators acted primarily as intermediaries on safety issues and failed to exert pressure on Lonmin management to negotiate directly with the strikers, despite the potential to defuse the situation.

APA

Bruce, D. (2016). Commissioners and commanders. Institute for Security Studies. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/mono194-2.pdf

Chicago

Bruce, David. Commissioners and commanders. Institute for Security Studies, 2016. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/mono194-2.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Bruce |first1=David |title=Commissioners and commanders |publisher=Institute for Security Studies |date=2016 |url=https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/mono194-2.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{bruce2016commissioners, author = {Bruce, David}, title = {{Commissioners and commanders}}, institution = {Institute for Security Studies}, year = {2016}, url = {https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/mono194-2.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }