The (Northern) Uganda Peace Process: An Update on recent developments

The Juba peace process between the government of Uganda (GOU) and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) has stalled, primarily due to Joseph Kony's refusal to sign the Final Peace Agreement (FPA) over concerns regarding International Criminal Court (ICC) indictments. The conflict has expanded beyond northern Uganda into southern Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and the Central African Republic (CAR), effectively becoming a regional conflict system. While the Juba talks are described as the most comprehensive effort to date, they lack sufficient leverage to coerce parties into an agreement. Consequently, regional military cooperation between Uganda, the DRC, and southern Sudan has increased, including a joint offensive in Garamba (DRC) in December 2008. The document argues that a purely military solution is unlikely to succeed and that a sustainable end-game requires a multi-pronged approach addressing regional rivalries and the tension between peace and international justice.

• The Juba peace process is currently stalled because Joseph Kony refused to sign the Final Peace Agreement (FPA) in April and May 2008, citing a need for clarity on accountability and the withdrawal of ICC indictments.
• The LRA insurgency has evolved from a local conflict into a regionalised one, with activities spreading into the Central African Republic (CAR), southern Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).
• Internal instability within the LRA, specifically a schism between Joseph Kony and his deputy Vincent Otti, has undermined the peace process; Otti was allegedly detained in November 2007 and executed in the Garamba forest.
• Military options have become more attractive to the Ugandan government, leading to joint operations with the DRC and southern Sudan, including a December 2008 offensive in Garamba, DRC.
• The Juba talks are considered the most comprehensive peace effort in Uganda's history, utilizing a five-item agenda covering cessation of violence, root causes, accountability, the fate of combatants, and a final ceasefire.
• The International Criminal Court (ICC) has played a dual role: its arrest warrants initially pressured the LRA to negotiate but later became a primary obstacle to signing the final agreement.

APA

Mwaniki, D., Wepundi, M., & Morolong, H. (2009). The (Northern) Uganda Peace Process: An Update on recent developments. Institute for Security Studies. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/SITREPUGANDA02-02-09.PDF

Chicago

Mwaniki, David, Manasseh Wepundi, and Harriet Morolong. The (Northern) Uganda Peace Process: An Update on recent developments. Institute for Security Studies, 2009. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/SITREPUGANDA02-02-09.PDF.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Mwaniki |first1=David |last2=Wepundi |first2=Manasseh |last3=Morolong |first3=Harriet |title=The (Northern) Uganda Peace Process: An Update on recent developments |publisher=Institute for Security Studies |date=2 February 2009 |url=https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/SITREPUGANDA02-02-09.PDF |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{mwaniki2009northern, author = {Mwaniki, David and Wepundi, Manasseh and Morolong, Harriet}, title = {{The (Northern) Uganda Peace Process: An Update on recent developments}}, institution = {Institute for Security Studies}, year = {2009}, month = feb, url = {https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/SITREPUGANDA02-02-09.PDF}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }