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Peace in the Kivu’s? An analysis of the Nairobi and Goma Agreements

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This briefing by the Institute for Security Studies analyzes the 2007 Nairobi Agreement and the 2008 Goma Acte d’engagement, evaluating their potential to stabilize the Kivu provinces in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). It examines the challenges of disarming the Forces Démocratique de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) and the Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP), while highlighting the critical failures of the Congolese army (FARDC) and the broader Security Sector Reform (SSR) process.

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  • The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) government and Rwanda signed the Nairobi Agreement on 9 November 2007, committing the DRC to forcibly disarm the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) and Rwanda to seal its borders to prevent support for armed groups like Laurent Nkunda's CNDP.
  • The Goma conference, held from 6 to 23 January 2008, resulted in the Goma declaration and the 'Acte d’engagement', which aimed to address the conflict in the Kivu provinces and linked peace and security to the implementation of the Nairobi declaration and the DDRRR of the FDLR.
  • The Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) suffers from severe operational deficiencies, including poor training, logistics, and discipline, rendering it incapable of conducting significant offensive operations against armed groups in the near future.
  • The FDLR remains a significant regional actor with approximately 6,000 combatants; its leadership's genocidal ideology and the threat of prosecution via the Gacaca court system in Rwanda are primary obstacles to their voluntary demobilization.
  • Laurent Nkunda and the CNDP attempted to establish a 'shadow state' in North Kivu by providing community services and replacing Congolese police, while resisting the standard 'brassage' process of army integration.
  • The 2002 Pretoria Agreement failed to achieve its goal of repatriating the FDLR within 90 days, despite Rwanda withdrawing over 20,000 soldiers from the Eastern DRC.

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APA
Boshoff, H., & Hoebeke, H. (2008). Peace in the Kivu’s? An analysis of the Nairobi and Goma Agreements. Institute for Security Studies. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/SITREPDRC310708.PDF
Chicago
Boshoff, Henri, and Hans Hoebeke. Peace in the Kivu’s? An analysis of the Nairobi and Goma Agreements. Institute for Security Studies, 2008. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/SITREPDRC310708.PDF.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Boshoff |first1=Henri |last2=Hoebeke |first2=Hans |title=Peace in the Kivu’s? An analysis of the Nairobi and Goma Agreements |publisher=Institute for Security Studies |date=30 July 2008 |url=https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/SITREPDRC310708.PDF |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
BibTeX
@techreport{boshoff2008peace, author = {Boshoff, Henri and Hoebeke, Hans}, title = {{Peace in the Kivu’s? An analysis of the Nairobi and Goma Agreements}}, institution = {Institute for Security Studies}, year = {2008}, month = jul, url = {https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/SITREPDRC310708.PDF}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }

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