Protecting the public or politically compromised? South Africa’s anti-corruption bodies

This report examines the operational independence of South Africa's National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) and the Office of the Public Protector (PP), arguing that both have been compromised by political interference and the appointment of partisan leaders.

• The National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) has suffered from a history of political instability and a design that facilitates political control, particularly through the appointment process.
• The NPA's independence was severely undermined when various presidents appointed leaders they believed they could control, often selecting individuals with visible political alignments.
• The NPA's independence was 'fatally compromised' following the suspension of Vusi Pikoli by President Mbeki in 2007, which the report views as an executive invasion of the institution's operations.
• During Jacob Zuma's presidency, the NPA remained in a state of 'perpetual insecurity and compromise,' with appointments often based on the candidate's willingness to protect the president from prosecution.
• The Office of the Public Protector (PP) has generally fared better than the NPA due to stronger constitutional guarantees of independence, but its effectiveness has depended heavily on the individual in charge.
• Thuli Madonsela is regarded as the most effective Public Protector, noted for her diligence and willingness to challenge powerful figures, including her investigation into 'state capture' and President Zuma's Nkandla residence.
• The appointment of Busisiwe Mkhwebane as Public Protector led to a 'sharp spike in pessimism' and a crisis of public confidence after courts found her to be dishonest, biased, and acting in bad faith.
• The report concludes that even robust formal guarantees of independence cannot prevent an anti-corruption body from being suborned if there is a determined executive and a compliant incumbent.
• To bolster independence, the report recommends implementing separate budgets for the NPA, constraining presidential discretion in appointments through law, and involving civil society in the recruitment process.

APA

February, J. (2019). Protecting the public or politically compromised? South Africa’s anti-corruption bodies. Institute for Security Studies. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/sar-31.pdf

Chicago

February, Judith. Protecting the public or politically compromised? South Africa’s anti-corruption bodies. Institute for Security Studies, 2019. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/sar-31.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=February |first1=Judith |title=Protecting the public or politically compromised? South Africa’s anti-corruption bodies |publisher=Institute for Security Studies |date=October 2019 |url=https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/sar-31.pdf |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{february2019protecting, author = {February, Judith}, title = {{Protecting the public or politically compromised? South Africa’s anti-corruption bodies}}, institution = {Institute for Security Studies}, year = {2019}, month = oct, url = {https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/sar-31.pdf}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }