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Accountability for corruption: the role of the Special Investigating Unit

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This report analyses the Special Investigating Unit (SIU), a South African government agency focused on the civil recovery of misappropriated state resources. It examines the SIU's history, its limited independence due to its reliance on presidential proclamations, and the challenges it faces in translating investigative findings into criminal or disciplinary accountability through other state agencies.

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  • The Special Investigating Unit (SIU) is a dedicated anti-corruption agency that focuses on the recovery of state resources rather than acting as a criminal justice agency.
  • The SIU lacks independence because it is created by presidential proclamation, and its investigations can only be initiated through such proclamations.
  • The SIU's effectiveness in recovering state resources may be significantly improved by the resuscitation of the Special Tribunal, which was approved by President Cyril Ramaphosa in February 2019.
  • There is a significant gap in accountability as the SIU often lacks information on whether the cases it refers to government departments or the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) result in criminal convictions or disciplinary action.
  • The process of referring SIU cases to the NPA often involves the NPA referring them back to the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation (Hawks), leading to concerns regarding the duplication of investigations and inefficient use of state resources.
  • The SIU's budget for the 2019–20 year is R363 million, which is 13% higher than that of the Independent Police Investigative Directorate and 15% more than the Public Protector's, but only 22% of the budget received by the Hawks.
  • The SIU has shifted its operational focus from 'small-value high-volume investigations', such as social grant fraud, toward more complex cases, particularly in the area of procurement.
  • The presidential power to authorize investigations via proclamation creates a risk that the SIU may be perceived as a political tool used to target opponents or, conversely, be misused to delay investigations into the Executive.

Cite the original document

APA
Institute for Security Studies (n.d.). Accountability for corruption: the role of the Special Investigating Unit. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/sar-28.pdf
Chicago
Institute for Security Studies. Accountability for corruption: the role of the Special Investigating Unit. n.d. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/sar-28.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |author=Institute for Security Studies |title=Accountability for corruption: the role of the Special Investigating Unit |url=https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/sar-28.pdf |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
BibTeX
@techreport{instituteforsecuritystudiesndaccountability, author = {{Institute for Security Studies}}, title = {{Accountability for corruption: the role of the Special Investigating Unit}}, institution = {Institute for Security Studies}, url = {https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/sar-28.pdf}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }

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