The Khayelitsha Commission of Inquiry

This research paper analyses the legal dispute regarding the Premier of the Western Cape's authority to appoint a commission of inquiry into police inefficiency in Khayelitsha. It examines the resulting judgments from the Western Cape High Court and the Constitutional Court to clarify the scope of provincial policing powers versus national competency in South Africa.

• The Constitutional Court affirmed that while policing is a national competency, provincial executives have a constitutionally mandated function to monitor, oversee, and promote relations between the police and the community. This includes the power under section 206(5) of the Constitution to appoint commissions of inquiry to investigate police inefficiency or breakdowns in community relations.
• The Constitutional Court rejected the argument that granting a commission of inquiry the power to subpoena witnesses constitutes an illegal usurpation of the National Commissioner's control over the police service. The court ruled that without subpoena powers, a commission would be unable to fulfill its mandate, as police cannot be immune from testifying or producing documents.
• A minority judgment from the Western Cape High Court argued that the appointment of the Khayelitsha commission was premature. It suggested that the Premier failed to exhaust obligations regarding inter-governmental cooperation by not continuing to engage with the Minister of Police and the National Commissioner before establishing the commission.
• The author identifies several impediments to the exercise of provincial policing powers, including the refusal of some SAPS provincial management to recognize executive powers, the fact that provinces are dependent on the Minister of Police for national policing policy, and the requirement that commissions of inquiry must be triggered by public complaints rather than being established ex mero motu.
• The author notes that the effectiveness of provincial police accountability is further compromised by the potential for the Minister of Police to ignore recommendations from a commission of inquiry and by weak provincial legislatures that fail to hold the provincial commissioner or the Department of Community Safety accountable.

APA

Tyabazayo, P. (2014). The Khayelitsha Commission of Inquiry. Institute for Security Studies. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/SACQ_50_Tyabazayo.pdf

Chicago

Tyabazayo, Phumlani. The Khayelitsha Commission of Inquiry. Institute for Security Studies, 2014. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/SACQ_50_Tyabazayo.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Tyabazayo |first1=Phumlani |title=The Khayelitsha Commission of Inquiry |publisher=Institute for Security Studies |date=December 2014 |url=https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/SACQ_50_Tyabazayo.pdf |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{tyabazayo2014khayelitsha, author = {Tyabazayo, Phumlani}, title = {{The Khayelitsha Commission of Inquiry}}, institution = {Institute for Security Studies}, year = {2014}, month = dec, url = {https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/SACQ_50_Tyabazayo.pdf}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }