Relançar a Reforma do sector da Defesa e da Segurança na Guiné-Bissau

This policy brief by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) analyzes the persistent blockages in the Security Sector Reform (SSR) process in Guinea-Bissau. It examines the historical role of the armed forces, the failures of previous reform attempts since 2005, and the political tensions between military and civilian authorities. The document provides recommendations to relaunch the reform by focusing on realistic force sizes, institutionalization, and the role of regional partners like ECOWAS.

• The Guinea-Bissau army is characterized by an oversized force relative to its population and a distorted rank structure. In 2016, the army had over 4,000 men, representing more than two soldiers per thousand inhabitants, a ratio higher than neighbors Senegal and Guinea. The rank pyramid is inverted due to promotion inflation; for example, the number of generals and admirals grew from just one in the 1990s to 17 in 2009 and 37 by 2017.
• The military institution suffers from systemic dysfunction, including a lack of professional training and the prevalence of clientelism. As of 2016, only slightly more than 200 out of 4,000 registered soldiers possessed higher education. Recruitment, promotions, and salary payments have historically been governed by "disputes of networks" and arbitrary decisions by unit chiefs rather than stable rules.
• Security Sector Reform (SSR) efforts since 2005 have often been perceived by the military as punitive measures or political purges, leading to a cycle of politization and resistance. Many soldiers view reform as an "economic assassination" or a tool for "desbalantização" (removing the Balanta ethnic group), which creates adversaries for every new attempt.
• A 2006 national strategy for SSR proposed a comprehensive action plan estimated at 184 million dollars. Key objectives included reducing defense forces to 3,440 men, reorganizing police forces through the creation of a National Guard, establishing military and police schools, and creating reintegration programs for liberation combatants.
• The reform process is currently blocked by a lack of trust between three main groups: a fragile civilian power that fears military coups; a suspicious military that demands financial gratifications; and international partners who are frustrated by the lack of progress and the continued presence of "spoilers" (officers involved in coups or drug trafficking).
• To successfully relaunch the SSR, the document recommends that the military hierarchy take ownership of the process, establish a realistic and reduced force size to lower state spending, and maintain the presence of the ECOWAS stabilization force (ECOMIB) to discourage military unrest until at least 2019.

APA

Institute for Security Studies (2018). Relançar a Reforma do sector da Defesa e da Segurança na Guiné-Bissau. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/policybrief-guineabissau-5-por.pdf

Chicago

Institute for Security Studies. Relançar a Reforma do sector da Defesa e da Segurança na Guiné-Bissau. 2018. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/policybrief-guineabissau-5-por.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |author=Institute for Security Studies |title=Relançar a Reforma do sector da Defesa e da Segurança na Guiné-Bissau |date=May 2018 |url=https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/policybrief-guineabissau-5-por.pdf |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{instituteforsecuritystudies2018relanar, author = {{Institute for Security Studies}}, title = {{Relançar a Reforma do sector da Defesa e da Segurança na Guiné-Bissau}}, institution = {Institute for Security Studies}, year = {2018}, month = may, url = {https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/policybrief-guineabissau-5-por.pdf}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }