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This policy brief argues that the internal reform of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) is a fundamental prerequisite for sustainable peace and nation-building in South Sudan. The author contends that the 2013 conflict was triggered by a breakdown of political order and the party's failure to transition from a militarised liberation movement to a democratic ruling party. The document recommends formally linking SPLM internal restructuring—including demilitarisation, the establishment of leadership succession processes, and the empowerment of grassroots structures—to the broader peace negotiations facilitated by the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD).

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  • The internal reform of the SPLM must be directly linked to the peace negotiations between President Salva Kiir and Dr Riek Machar’s SPLM-in-Opposition to ensure accountability and prevent future political crises from escalating into war.
  • The SPLM's failure to transform is attributed to four primary factors: a revolutionary tradition of centralised authority and rigid hierarchy; a blurred distinction between the state and the party; a lack of institutionalisation where party organs meet only sporadically; and deep divisions among elites regarding the party's vision and ideology.
  • The party is currently split into three main factions: President Kiir’s faction (perceived as having a Bahr el Ghazal and Dinka bias), Machar’s SPLM-in-Opposition (perceived as having a Greater Upper Nile and Nuer bias), and the 'Reformers' or SPLM-in-Detention led by Pagan Amum, who are described as the most nationally representative group.
  • To achieve transformation, the SPLM must demilitarise by neutralising the legacy of SPLA seniority, demobilising private militias, and ensuring the SPLA becomes a professional national army without a political role.
  • The document recommends that SPLM leadership be elected through open and transparent processes at regular intervals, moving away from power by 'arrangement' or based on military seniority.
  • The SPLM needs to empower its lower-level structures—including secretariats, liberation councils, and congresses at the Boma, Payam, county, and state levels—to connect the central leadership with the grassroots.

Cite the original document

APA
Institute for Security Studies (n.d.). 8427 ISS Policy Brief 63.indd. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/PolBrief63.pdf
Chicago
Institute for Security Studies. 8427 ISS Policy Brief 63.indd. n.d. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/PolBrief63.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |author=Institute for Security Studies |title=8427 ISS Policy Brief 63.indd |url=https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/PolBrief63.pdf |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
BibTeX
@techreport{instituteforsecuritystudiesnd8427, author = {{Institute for Security Studies}}, title = {{8427 ISS Policy Brief 63.indd}}, institution = {Institute for Security Studies}, url = {https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/PolBrief63.pdf}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }

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