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This policy brief analyzes the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and the resulting state of emergency on political stability in Ethiopia. It argues that while the pandemic initially calmed political rivalries, it may in the medium to long term increase vulnerability to riots and organized violence, particularly regarding governance disputes following the postponement of national elections.

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  • The initial onset of the COVID-19 pandemic served to temporarily reduce political tensions in Ethiopia. Opposing groups shifted their focus toward managing the health crisis rather than pursuing contentious political agendas, which defused both vertical and horizontal conflicts.
  • In the short term, the pandemic and the government's response measures may trigger disorganized unrest and riots. This risk is driven by economic desperation, particularly among the urban poor and those in the informal sector, as well as potential food insecurity caused by state of emergency restrictions on the movement of goods.
  • The postponement of national elections, originally scheduled for late August, has created a potential legitimacy crisis for the ruling party. Disagreements between the government and opposition parties over how to govern after the five-month state of emergency ends could lead to a political deadlock or a regime-opposition standoff.
  • The state of emergency provides the ruling Prosperity Party an opportunity to strengthen its institutional power, reclaim lost structures, and centralize its security apparatus. However, this institutional growth may not be accompanied by ideological coherence, as the pandemic halted internal party reorganization and discussion sessions.
  • Opposition parties have seen their capacity for mobilization and internal reorganization severely hindered by pandemic containment measures. While they may still be able to stir public opposition, they may lack the institutional coherence to lead orderly challenges to state rule, potentially making future opposition movements chaotic.
  • The Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) is expected to emerge as a powerful opposition force because it is implementing its own state of emergency at the regional level. This allows the TPLF to increase its mobilization and control within the Tigray region, making it a likely epicenter of future opposition politics.

Cite the original document

APA
Yusuf, S. (2020). COVID-19 and political stability in Ethiopia. Institute for Security Studies. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/pb143-2.pdf
Chicago
Yusuf, Semir. COVID-19 and political stability in Ethiopia. Institute for Security Studies, 2020. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/pb143-2.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Yusuf |first1=Semir |title=COVID-19 and political stability in Ethiopia |publisher=Institute for Security Studies |date=2020 |url=https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/pb143-2.pdf |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
BibTeX
@techreport{yusuf2020covid19, author = {Yusuf, Semir}, title = {{COVID-19 and political stability in Ethiopia}}, institution = {Institute for Security Studies}, year = {2020}, url = {https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/pb143-2.pdf}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }

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