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This research paper by the Institute for Security Studies evaluates South Africa's participation in international peace missions, comparing the guidelines of the 1999 White Paper on South African Participation in Peace Missions against actual practices in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burundi, and Lesotho. The authors argue that decision-making remains overly centralized in the presidency, often bypassing mandated inter-departmental consultation and parliamentary oversight.

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  • The 1999 White Paper on South African Participation in Peace Missions mandates a multi-disciplinary approach to conflict resolution, integrating political, economic, social, cultural, and personal security, and requires contributions from military, police, and civilian elements.
  • Despite the White Paper's requirement for extensive interdepartmental consultation led by the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), decisions are frequently made at the presidential level with minimal input from other government bodies, civil society, or Parliament.
  • Operation Boleas in Lesotho was characterized by a confused decision-making process and a lack of clear strategic communication, leading the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) to admit that the 'psychological and media war' was lost.
  • South Africa's role as the 'Lead Nation' for the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) places a disproportionate burden of responsibility on the SANDF, as the African Union (AU) lacks the institutional, financial, and logistical capacity to manage the mission's military aspects.
  • The deployment of 150 technical personnel to the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) in April 2001 is cited as a successful model of coordination, involving feasibility studies by the Department of Defence (DoD) and foreign policy analysis by the DFA before Cabinet approval.
  • The South African Police Service (SAPS) has failed to deploy a single police officer to a peace mission despite the White Paper's goal to balance international obligations with domestic needs, partly due to security challenges within South Africa.
  • Peacekeeping operations have created significant budgetary deficits for the Department of Defence, as there is typically no standing budgetary provision for these missions, forcing reliance on emergency fund mechanisms.
  • High operational tempo in peace missions risks depleting the SANDF's specialized personnel, such as engineers and medical staff, who are highly sought after by the better-paying private sector.
  • The National Office for the Co-ordination of Peace Missions (NOCPM), intended to be the central contact point for deployments, remains understaffed and marginalized, with only three full-time staff members out of a suggested ten.

Cite the original document

APA
Institute for Security Studies (n.d.). paper 72.qxd. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/PAPER72.PDF
Chicago
Institute for Security Studies. paper 72.qxd. n.d. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/PAPER72.PDF.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |author=Institute for Security Studies |title=paper 72.qxd |url=https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/PAPER72.PDF |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
BibTeX
@techreport{instituteforsecuritystudiesndpaper, author = {{Institute for Security Studies}}, title = {{paper 72.qxd}}, institution = {Institute for Security Studies}, url = {https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/PAPER72.PDF}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }

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