The Khampepe Commission

This research paper by Prince Mashele of the Institute for Security Studies provides an overview of the proceedings of the Khampepe Commission, established in 2005 to review the mandate and location of the Directorate of Special Operations (DSO), known as the 'Scorpions'. The document details the tensions between the Scorpions and the South African Police Service (SAPS), the debate over the DSO's broad statutory mandate, and the political and technical arguments regarding whether the unit should remain within the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) or be incorporated into the SAPS.

• The Directorate of Special Operations (DSO), or 'Scorpions', was established in September 1999 by President Thabo Mbeki to combat rising levels of organised crime and police corruption, filling a vacuum created during South Africa's transition to democracy.
• The Khampepe Commission was appointed on 1 April 2005 by President Mbeki to review the mandate and location of the DSO following tensions between the Scorpions and the South African Police Service (SAPS), as well as negative reactions to the investigation of high-profile politicians.
• A primary point of contention was the broad nature of the DSO's mandate, which led to operational overlaps with the SAPS. The SAPS argued that the NPA Act provides for 'virtually unlimited extension' of investigative powers, leading to instances where the DSO took over police investigations that were nearly complete.
• The SAPS advocated for the incorporation of the DSO into the police service, arguing that section 199 of the Constitution requires a single police service and that the SAPS is not in favour of the 'prosecution-led approach' used by the Scorpions.
• The National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) and the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) argued for maintaining the DSO within the NPA to preserve the prosecution-led model, which allows prosecutors to guide investigators from the start to secure convictions.
• The intelligence community identified a legislative gap regarding the DSO's accountability. The Inspector General of Intelligence and the Minister of Intelligence recommended amending the Intelligence Oversight Act and the National Strategic Intelligence Act to bring the DSO under formal oversight and coordination.
• The Ministerial Coordinating Committee (MCC), designed to prevent conflicts between the DSO and other agencies, failed to function effectively, meeting only six times between June 2004 and August 2005 despite the DSO operating since 2001.
• While the SAPS accused the DSO of 'cherry-picking' cases that were already nearly solved to claim success, an independent study by the ISS concluded that the DSO had an 'excellent record of success in obtaining convictions' in the cases it chose to prosecute.

APA

Mashele, P. (2006). The Khampepe Commission. Institute for Security Studies. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/Paper126pdf.pdf

Chicago

Mashele, Prince. The Khampepe Commission. Institute for Security Studies, 2006. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/Paper126pdf.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Mashele |first1=Prince |title=The Khampepe Commission |publisher=Institute for Security Studies |date=June 2006 |url=https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/Paper126pdf.pdf |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{mashele2006khampepe, author = {Mashele, Prince}, title = {{The Khampepe Commission}}, institution = {Institute for Security Studies}, year = {2006}, month = jun, url = {https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/Paper126pdf.pdf}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }