Ports of Entry

This report assesses security at South African air and sea ports of entry to identify vulnerabilities in the prevention of firearms trafficking. It evaluates the implementation of international standards (ICAO, IMO, IATA, FAA) and national legislation. Key findings highlight systemic weaknesses such as staffing shortages, lack of professional training, and critical gaps in information sharing between airports (e.g., Lanseria). The report recommends enhanced risk profiling, integrated databases, and integrity testing for security personnel.

• The report identifies several systemic shortcomings in South African port security, including a lack of equipment, staffing shortages, and inadequate levels of professionalism and training. It specifically recommends the introduction of integrity testing and corruption-prevention training for security personnel to address the human factor.
• The International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) adopted Amendment 10 to Annex 17 in December 2001, which significantly hardened airport controls. Key changes include requiring aircraft security checks of interiors and holds, background checks for individuals with unescorted access to restricted areas, and extending security measures to domestic travel.
• The US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations serve as an international benchmark for best practice because South Africa exports a large volume of passengers and goods to the USA. The FAA requires foreign airports to design Air Security Programmes (ASPs) and conducts periodic inspections via Special Agents to ensure compliance with minimum standards.
• At Johannesburg International Airport (JIA), the report notes that baggage screening is primarily designed to detect improvised explosive devices or bombs; while Z-scan machines can detect firearms, operators are generally only concerned with whether the firearm is properly packed rather than its legality.
• Lanseria Airport is identified as a security concern due to its status as a large charter airport. A critical vulnerability exists because the Movement Control System (MCS) is not linked to other South African airports, meaning travellers who arrive at one airport and depart from another (such as hunters with rifles) may not be checked for the removal of their firearms.
• The report highlights a lack of standardised, accredited training for aviation and border security management in South Africa. Most current training is provided on an ad hoc basis by foreign entities like the FBI or UNOCPDC, or is gained through in-house 'on-the-job' experience.
• In the maritime sector, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) sets safety standards through treaties like the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), but it does not provide specific security manuals for port-side security, leaving those responsibilities to local port authorities.
• The report notes a smuggling trend where new clothing is illegally imported by disguising it as second-hand clothing or rags to avoid a duty of R25/kg.

APA

Minnaar, A. (n.d.). Ports of Entry. Institute for Security Studies. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/Mono84.pdf

Chicago

Minnaar, Anthony. Ports of Entry. Institute for Security Studies, n.d. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/Mono84.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Minnaar |first1=Anthony |title=Ports of Entry |publisher=Institute for Security Studies |url=https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/Mono84.pdf |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{minnaarndports, author = {Minnaar, Anthony}, title = {{Ports of Entry}}, institution = {Institute for Security Studies}, url = {https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/Mono84.pdf}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }