The sound of gunfire

This report analyzes the police shootings at 'Scene 2' (also known as Koppie 3) during the Marikana massacre on 16 August 2012, where 17 people were killed by the South African Police Service (SAPS). The author argues that there is no credible evidence that strikers attacked police at Scene 2, and that many victims were shot while surrendering or were hit by reckless gunfire directed into a 'killing zone'. The report highlights a systemic pattern of dishonesty and collusion among SAPS members to manufacture a self-justifying narrative, often using a misleading media statement as a script.

• At Scene 2, 17 people were killed by the South African Police Service (SAPS) on 16 August 2012. The shootings occurred over approximately 11 minutes, involving 57 police shooters from the National Intervention Unit (NIU), Tactical Response Team (TRT), K9 unit, and Public Order Police (POP).
• The report concludes that it is unlikely strikers attacked police at Scene 2. No cartridge cases linked to striker firearms were found at the scene, and 124 analyzed statements from injured or arrested strikers contained no references to strikers shooting at or attacking police.
• Evidence indicates that many strikers were shot while surrendering (SWS). Out of a final sample of 124 statements from strikers, 46 (37%) contained descriptions of people being shot while raising their hands or begging for mercy.
• A 'killing zone' was established at Scene 2 where 11 victims were fatally shot. The report argues these deaths were not 'incidental' or 'crossfire' but the result of gunfire directed into the area, including shots fired from the top of the high rocks by NIU members.
• The SAPS is accused of systemic dishonesty and collusion to justify the killings. The report identifies a 'police narrative' manufactured during a 'Roots' meeting in Potchefstroom from 27 August to 8 September 2012, intended to ensure consistency and absolve the SAPS of blame.
• Many police officers used a misleading media statement released by Commissioner Phiyega on 17 August 2012 as a 'script' or template for their initial statements, frequently using the word 'storm' to describe striker movements despite a lack of objective evidence.
• The report identifies a lack of command and control at Scene 2. Major General Naidoo and Brigadier Calitz are criticized for failing to coordinate units or stop the shooting, with some units approaching the koppie on their own initiative.
• SAPS members are alleged to have assaulted strikers after the shootings. 68 of 124 analyzed striker statements (55%) reported being kicked, beaten with rifle butts, or teargassed while being arrested.
• There is evidence that police deliberately denied medical treatment to a seriously injured striker, Mr Sagalala, who died in a police vehicle (Canter). Strikers reported that police told the injured man 'he must die'.

APA

Bruce, D. (2018). The sound of gunfire. Institute for Security Studies. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/marikana-report.pdf

Chicago

Bruce, David. The sound of gunfire. Institute for Security Studies, 2018. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/marikana-report.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Bruce |first1=David |title=The sound of gunfire |publisher=Institute for Security Studies |date=August 2018 |url=https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/marikana-report.pdf |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{bruce2018sound, author = {Bruce, David}, title = {{The sound of gunfire}}, institution = {Institute for Security Studies}, year = {2018}, month = aug, url = {https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/marikana-report.pdf}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }