Shielding elections from presidential influence

The report examines the practice of incumbents stepping aside before presidential elections in Cabo Verde and Madagascar. It argues that while not a complete solution, this practice helps level the electoral playing field by denying incumbents direct control over state resources and security agencies during campaigns. The author suggests that for the practice to be effective, it must be supported by clear constitutional provisions, political will, and broader good governance reforms.

• The practice of incumbents resigning or leaving office before seeking re-election can improve the fairness of electoral outcomes without causing major disruptions to government operations.
• Requiring a president to step aside helps create a level playing field by preventing the direct use of state security agencies and resources to manipulate elections, such as initiating projects immediately before polls or intimidating opponents.
• In Cabo Verde, the 2016 presidential election saw President Jorge Carlos Fonseca suspend his mandate two months before the vote, a move that the African Union noted helped ensure equal treatment for all candidates.
• In Madagascar, the 2018 presidential election required President Hery Rajaonarimampianina to resign 60 days before the ballot, which is considered to have reduced the potential for the incumbent to exploit his office and destabilize the country.
• The practice can reduce post-electoral violence by improving the perception among opposition parties and citizens that the electoral process was fair and the playing field was even.
• Stepping aside is not a guaranteed solution because incumbents may still maintain influence through patronage networks, popularity, or by appointing loyalists as caretakers to work in their favor.

APA

Atta-Asamoah, A. (2020). Shielding elections from presidential influence. Institute for Security Studies. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/ar23.pdf

Chicago

Atta-Asamoah, Andrews. Shielding elections from presidential influence. Institute for Security Studies, 2020. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/ar23.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Atta-Asamoah |first1=Andrews |title=Shielding elections from presidential influence |publisher=Institute for Security Studies |date=April 2020 |url=https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/ar23.pdf |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{attaasamoah2020shielding, author = {Atta-Asamoah, Andrews}, title = {{Shielding elections from presidential influence}}, institution = {Institute for Security Studies}, year = {2020}, month = apr, url = {https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/ar23.pdf}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }