Shielding elections from presidential influence

This report examines the practice of requiring sitting presidents to resign or step aside before seeking re-election to mitigate the abuse of incumbency. Using case studies from Cabo Verde and Madagascar, the author argues that this mechanism helps level the electoral playing field and reduces post-electoral violence by improving the perceived integrity of the process.

• The abuse of incumbency in Africa manifests primarily through three forms: coercive abuse (limiting opposition access to media and resources), corrupt practices (using state personnel and equipment for campaigns or capturing electoral bodies), and vote-buying (using cash or timing development projects to favor the incumbent).
• In Cabo Verde, the 2016 presidential elections saw President Jorge Carlos Fonseca suspend his mandate two months prior to the polls in accordance with Article 383 (a) of the 2010 Electoral Act. This move was noted by the African Union as having helped to strengthen the equal treatment of candidates by limiting the president's ability to exploit his office.
• Madagascar's 2018 presidential elections required President Hery Rajaonarimampianina to resign sixty days before the ballot per Article 46 of the 2010 Constitution. This requirement was significant given the country's history of volatile post-election power struggles since 2001, and it served to curtail the exploitation of the presidency during a period of low presidential popularity.
• The practice of stepping aside provides two primary benefits: it creates a level playing field by denying incumbents direct control over state security agencies and resources (such as the ability to initiate projects immediately before elections), and it improves the perception of electoral integrity, which can reduce post-electoral violence.
• A significant challenge to the practice is that it does not remove all incumbency advantages, such as existing patronage networks and popularity. Furthermore, if the legal framework is unclear, incumbents may appoint loyalists as acting presidents to continue exploiting state power in their favor, as illustrated by the 2019 Comoros elections.
• For the practice to be effective, it should not be implemented in isolation but alongside broader good governance reforms. Success depends on clear constitutional provisions regarding succession to prevent the appointment of loyalists, extensive voter education, and a political culture that respects the rule of law.

APA

Atta-Asamoah, A. (2020). Shielding elections from presidential influence. Institute for Security Studies. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/ar23.pdf

Chicago

Atta-Asamoah, Andrews. Shielding elections from presidential influence. Institute for Security Studies, 2020. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/ar23.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Atta-Asamoah |first1=Andrews |title=Shielding elections from presidential influence |publisher=Institute for Security Studies |date=April 2020 |url=https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/ar23.pdf |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{attaasamoah2020shielding, author = {Atta-Asamoah, Andrews}, title = {{Shielding elections from presidential influence}}, institution = {Institute for Security Studies}, year = {2020}, month = apr, url = {https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/ar23.pdf}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }