Emerging theory for effective anti-corruption reform in South Africa
Summary
The policy brief critiques the 'good governance' paradigm's reliance on transparency and accountability, arguing it often fails in developing countries like South Africa. It proposes alternative frameworks, including 'political settlements' theory, collective action, and behavioural sciences, to address systemic corruption as a collective action problem driven by social norms and economic incentives rather than individual malice.
Key insights
- The dominant 'good governance' approach, which prioritises transparency, accountability, and better laws, is often ineffective in developing countries because it ignores context and assumes strong existing rule-of-law institutions.
- Systemic corruption in South Africa is described as a 'wicked problem' where corrupt practices are institutionalised and driven by social norms and economic incentives, making it highly resistant to traditional linear policy interventions.
- South Africa's corruption is characterised by two predominant types: 'clientelism' (political corruption used to maintain stability via patron-client networks) and 'plunder' (theft by a predatory elite enabled by unstable property rights and high inequality).
- The 'political settlements' theory suggests that anti-corruption success depends on the struggle between rule-following elites and non-rule-following elites; in South Africa, this was evidenced by the disbanding of the Scorpions, which led to a 30% decrease in investigations and prosecutions.
- Collective action approaches, which shift group value systems towards integrity rather than punishing individuals, have shown success elsewhere, such as the Maritime Anti-Corruption Network (MACN) in Nigeria, which reduced corruption in Lagos harbour by 96.2% between 2019 and 2022.
- Behavioural science 'nudges' can be effective in specific contexts of systemic corruption; a pilot project in a KwaZulu-Natal village used posters stating 'Bribery is going down in this town' to successfully reduce the number of bribes paid.
Cite the original document
- APA
- Ashton, C. (2024). Emerging theory for effective anti-corruption reform in South Africa. Institute for Security Studies. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/pages/1724659612996-PB-190-1.pdf
- Chicago
- Ashton, Colette. Emerging theory for effective anti-corruption reform in South Africa. Institute for Security Studies, 2024. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/pages/1724659612996-PB-190-1.pdf.
- Wikipedia
- {{cite report |last1=Ashton |first1=Colette |title=Emerging theory for effective anti-corruption reform in South Africa |publisher=Institute for Security Studies |date=2024 |url=https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/pages/1724659612996-PB-190-1.pdf |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
- BibTeX
- @techreport{ashton2024emerging, author = {Ashton, Colette}, title = {{Emerging theory for effective anti-corruption reform in South Africa}}, institution = {Institute for Security Studies}, year = {2024}, url = {https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/pages/1724659612996-PB-190-1.pdf}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }
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