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THE FUTURE OF RURAL POLICING IN SOUTH AFRICA AFTER THE COMMANDOS

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This report assesses the rural safety capacity lost by the phasing out of the South African National Defence Force’s (SANDF) Territorial Reserve, known as the Commandos, and evaluates the South African Police Service's (SAPS) ability to replace these functions. Through fieldwork in the Free State, Eastern Cape, and Gauteng, the author argues that while Commandos primarily protected the interests of the rural middle class and could be socially destructive if deployed inappropriately, they provided a critical force-multiplication capacity for policing agricultural crimes. The report concludes that the transition to SAPS is likely to result in a deterioration of rural policing because SAPS organizational incentives and national performance targets prioritize urban 'contact crimes' over rural property crimes.

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  • President Thabo Mbeki announced in February 2003 that the SANDF's Territorial Reserve (the Commandos) would be phased out, with the final units expected to cease operations by the end of the 2009 financial year. Their functions in borderline control and rural crime prevention are to be absorbed by the SAPS through Area Crime Combating Units (ACCUs) and sector policing structures.
  • The Commandos' composition shifted significantly after 1994; while white membership declined, black membership grew as the Territorial Reserve became a source of employment. By 2005, between 12,000 and 15,000 people depended on Commando work for their primary income.
  • The Commandos operated via two distinct structures: area-bound units, consisting mostly of white volunteers who provided local intelligence and rapid response for neighbors, and non-area bound (reaction) units, staffed largely by black professionals who served as a force multiplier for SAPS operations.
  • The report argues that the Commandos were not representative of the broader rural population, as their primary function was to protect the property and interests of the rural middle class, specifically commercial farmers.
  • In the Eastern Cape's De Mist Commando area, the unit acted as the lead agency for rural crime prevention because the Uitenhage SAPS station lacked the resources to police both its urban center and its remote hinterland effectively.
  • Borderline control between the Free State and Lesotho is complicated by economic desperation in Lesotho, leading to significant cannabis smuggling and livestock theft. The SANDF and Commandos struggle to combat these, with the report noting that the 'dagga train' and other smuggling methods often bypass official border posts.
  • The author contends that 'hotspot policing'—saturating high-risk areas with visible personnel—is the most effective method for combating agricultural crime across deep social divides, as social norms and community trust are often absent between commercial farmers and the populations in informal settlements.
  • The transition to the SAPS Reserve is hindered by remuneration issues; many former Commando members who relied on the units for income have not joined the voluntary police reserve, leading to an immediate loss of force-multiplication capacity in some areas.
  • SAPS organizational incentives are likely to divert resources away from rural areas. Station commissioners are evaluated based on a national target to reduce 'contact crimes' by seven percent annually, and since these crimes are concentrated in urban centers, managers are incentivized to deploy personnel there rather than in rural sectors.
  • The report concludes that the closure of the Commandos will likely lead to a deterioration in the policing of agricultural crimes, as the SAPS's centralized, target-driven management is ill-suited to the dispersed and socially complex nature of rural security.

Cite the original document

APA
STEINBERG, J. (2005). THE FUTURE OF RURAL POLICING IN SOUTH AFRICA AFTER THE COMMANDOS. Institute for Security Studies. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/120FULL.PDF
Chicago
STEINBERG, JONNY. THE FUTURE OF RURAL POLICING IN SOUTH AFRICA AFTER THE COMMANDOS. Institute for Security Studies, 2005. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/120FULL.PDF.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=STEINBERG |first1=JONNY |title=THE FUTURE OF RURAL POLICING IN SOUTH AFRICA AFTER THE COMMANDOS |publisher=Institute for Security Studies |date=October 2005 |url=https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/120FULL.PDF |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
BibTeX
@techreport{steinberg2005future, author = {STEINBERG, JONNY}, title = {{THE FUTURE OF RURAL POLICING IN SOUTH AFRICA AFTER THE COMMANDOS}}, institution = {Institute for Security Studies}, year = {2005}, month = oct, url = {https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/120FULL.PDF}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }

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