SECTOR POLICING THAT WORKS

This case study examines the implementation of sector policing in the West Rand area of Johannesburg, South Africa, starting in April 2003. It describes a transition from a centralized, 'saturation' style of policing to a decentralized model focused on local knowledge and long-term problem-solving. The document details the operational requirements of the sectors, the distinction between routine risk identification and complex problem-solving, and the resulting qualitative changes in police-civilian relations.

• The West Rand area implemented a high-risk version of sector policing by completely removing centralized capacity. All operational detectives and uniformed branch members were assigned to sectors, and the station-level crime prevention unit was disbanded, forcing the organization to succeed through decentralized problem-solving.
• The implementation of sector policing in the West Rand was incremental and resource-heavy. No sector was launched without a dedicated 24-hour patrol and response vehicle and a team of at least eight uniform branch members. This led to significant staff increases; for example, Roodepoort station grew from 180 to 340 members, and Kagiso rose from 134 to over 200 members over 19 months.
• Police tasks in the sectors are divided into simple and complex categories. Simple tasks involve risk identification and targeted patrolling based on monthly crime statistics and maps. Complex tasks require identifying environmental and situational causes of crime—such as broken street lights, vacant houses, or the presence of street gambling—and establishing crime prevention partnerships with civilians.
• Area management distinguishes between sectors that perform basic functions and those that are 'exceptional.' While most sectors are competent at risk identification and targeted patrolling, only exceptional sectors successfully dissolve hotspots into specific, actionable problems with identified causes.
• Sector policing has created new challenges in police-civilian relations, including 'mutual escalation' where personalized hostility leads to increased tension and the diversion of resources. Additionally, civilians may use the justice process as a form of 'informal delict,' calling police to open cases only when private agreements with offenders are broken.
• The success of the West Rand model is attributed to four factors: the total removal of central capacity (leaving no alternative but to succeed), the enthusiasm of Area management, the high proportion of new recruits who had no old habits to unlearn, and significant improvements in resources and managerial support for veteran officers.

APA

Steinberg, J. (2005). SECTOR POLICING THAT WORKS. Institute for Security Studies. https://issafrica.org/01-mar-2005-sacq-no-11/sector-policing-that-works

Chicago

Steinberg, Jonny. SECTOR POLICING THAT WORKS. Institute for Security Studies, 2005. https://issafrica.org/01-mar-2005-sacq-no-11/sector-policing-that-works.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Steinberg |first1=Jonny |title=SECTOR POLICING THAT WORKS |publisher=Institute for Security Studies |date=1 March 2005 |url=https://issafrica.org/01-mar-2005-sacq-no-11/sector-policing-that-works |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{steinberg2005sector, author = {Steinberg, Jonny}, title = {{SECTOR POLICING THAT WORKS}}, institution = {Institute for Security Studies}, year = {2005}, month = mar, url = {https://issafrica.org/01-mar-2005-sacq-no-11/sector-policing-that-works}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }