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This briefing by the Institute for Security Studies outlines a multi-dimensional strategy to stabilise Mozambique's Cabo Delgado province. It argues that while regional military support from the Southern African Development Community (SADC) is a starting point, long-term stability requires a people-centric approach addressing governance failures, poverty, and radicalisation, rather than a purely security-focused response.

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  • The conflict in Cabo Delgado is rooted in governance failures, including state absence and allegations of corruption within the ruling party, FRELIMO, which created a security vacuum and antagonised local populations.
  • The insurgency has caused significant humanitarian distress, resulting in 2,838 deaths (including 1,500 civilians) and the displacement of over 700,000 people.
  • Immediate security restoration requires a detailed intelligence picture and a 24-hour operations centre in northern Mozambique, prioritising human intelligence networks over technology like drones.
  • While a SADC force could provide critical capacity for non-conventional operations and coastline security, it cannot replace the need for accountable, well-trained Mozambican security forces.
  • Effective stabilisation must disrupt the links between violent extremism and organised crime, including maritime smuggling routes and potential funding from heroin networks transporting drugs from Afghanistan to Europe.
  • Medium-term stability depends on a criminal justice approach and a robust disarmament, demobilisation, rehabilitation and reintegration (DDR) programme rather than a purely military focus.
  • Long-term recovery requires poverty alleviation and alternative livelihoods to reduce reliance on the illicit economy. The Integrated Northern Development Agency (ADIN) is mobilising US$764 million for this, including US$25 million for cash transfers in Cabo Delgado, Niassa, and Nampula.

Cite the original document

APA
Ewi, M., Els, W., Cilliers, J., Louw-Vaudran, L., & Walker, T. (2021). What would it take to stabilise Cabo Delgado? Institute for Security Studies. https://issafrica.org/iss-today/what-would-it-take-to-stabilise-cabo-delgado
Chicago
Ewi, Martin, Willem Els, Jakkie Cilliers, Liesl Louw-Vaudran, and Timothy Walker. What would it take to stabilise Cabo Delgado? Institute for Security Studies, 2021. https://issafrica.org/iss-today/what-would-it-take-to-stabilise-cabo-delgado.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Ewi |first1=Martin |last2=Els |first2=Willem |last3=Cilliers |first3=Jakkie |last4=Louw-Vaudran |first4=Liesl |last5=Walker |first5=Timothy |title=What would it take to stabilise Cabo Delgado? |publisher=Institute for Security Studies |date=27 May 2021 |url=https://issafrica.org/iss-today/what-would-it-take-to-stabilise-cabo-delgado |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
BibTeX
@techreport{ewi2021what, author = {Ewi, Martin and Els, Willem and Cilliers, Jakkie and Louw-Vaudran, Liesl and Walker, Timothy}, title = {{What would it take to stabilise Cabo Delgado?}}, institution = {Institute for Security Studies}, year = {2021}, month = may, url = {https://issafrica.org/iss-today/what-would-it-take-to-stabilise-cabo-delgado}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }

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