Elections and accountability in South Africa
Summary
This research paper by Collette Schulz-Herzenberg of the Institute for Security Studies examines whether elections in South Africa serve as an effective accountability mechanism by analyzing voter behavior, perceptions of political parties, and cognitive mobilization.
Key insights
- While South African voters are willing to withdraw support from the incumbent party due to disapproval of its performance, they are unlikely to transfer that support to an alternative party.
- A lack of political information and cognitive skills among most voters prevents them from shifting party support based on policy positions or ongoing performance.
- The paper concludes that elections are a weak mechanism for sanctioning and holding the government to account in the traditional sense, suggesting that the method of 'selection' should be prioritized as a means to control politicians.
Cite the original document
- APA
- Schulz-Herzenberg, C. (n.d.). Elections and accountability in South Africa. Institute for Security Studies. https://issafrica.org/research/papers/elections-and-accountability-in-south-africa
- Chicago
- Schulz-Herzenberg, Collette. Elections and accountability in South Africa. Institute for Security Studies, n.d. https://issafrica.org/research/papers/elections-and-accountability-in-south-africa.
- Wikipedia
- {{cite report |last1=Schulz-Herzenberg |first1=Collette |title=Elections and accountability in South Africa |publisher=Institute for Security Studies |url=https://issafrica.org/research/papers/elections-and-accountability-in-south-africa |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
- BibTeX
- @techreport{schulzherzenbergndelections, author = {Schulz-Herzenberg, Collette}, title = {{Elections and accountability in South Africa}}, institution = {Institute for Security Studies}, url = {https://issafrica.org/research/papers/elections-and-accountability-in-south-africa}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }
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