Czechia: Country Election Risk Assessment

The report identifies a complex threat landscape for the 2025 Czech elections, where foreign actors—primarily Russia and China—exploit domestic polarization and economic grievances. Key risks include the use of AI-generated deepfakes, the proliferation of pro-Kremlin Telegram networks, and narratives targeting the legitimacy of the new postal voting system. While Czechia's decentralized electoral infrastructure is considered resilient, the report highlights critical gaps in regulatory strength, specifically the delayed implementation of the EU Digital Services Act (DSA) and inadequate oversight of third-party campaign financing.

• The introduction of postal voting for citizens abroad in 2025 has become a primary target for FIMI, with 60% of surveyed respondents fearing it will lead to electoral fraud.
• Russia remains the most active foreign actor, utilizing a network of Telegram channels (such as neČT24, Maršál Malinovskij, and Selský rozum) and the automated Pravda Network to disseminate pro-Kremlin propaganda.
• Chinese influence operations are characterized as more discreet than Russia's, focusing on cultural diplomacy, economic leverage, and the use of CGTN Radio to manage narratives around human rights and the war in Ukraine.
• Malign actors have deployed synthetic media to target high-level officials, including the use of deepfake audio and manipulated videos of President Petr Pavel to portray him as advocating war against Russia.
• The 'Voice of Europe' platform, based in Prague, was exposed as a Russian-sponsored hub that bribed European politicians to amplify Kremlin talking points ahead of the 2024 EU Parliament elections.
• Czechia faces a significant regulatory gap due to the failure to transpose the EU Digital Services Act (DSA) into national law by the 2024 deadline, which limits the Czech Telecommunication Office's ability to address systemic risks on social media.
• Campaign financing oversight is insufficient, with the Office for Economic Supervision of Political Parties lacking resources and issuing low fines, while third-party spending remains inadequately regulated.
• Anti-Ukraine narratives are prevalent, often framing Ukrainian refugees as an economic and security burden; 60% of Czechs feel the country has accepted more refugees than it can manage.
• The Czech electoral system's physical infrastructure is considered robust due to its decentralized nature, the use of paper ballots, and manual counting by citizen commissions.

APA

Institute for Strategic Dialogue (n.d.). Czechia: Country Election Risk Assessment. https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/FRT-24_Czechia-Country-Election-Risk-Assessment-CERA_FINAL.pdf

Chicago

Institute for Strategic Dialogue. Czechia: Country Election Risk Assessment. n.d. https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/FRT-24_Czechia-Country-Election-Risk-Assessment-CERA_FINAL.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |author=Institute for Strategic Dialogue |title=Czechia: Country Election Risk Assessment |url=https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/FRT-24_Czechia-Country-Election-Risk-Assessment-CERA_FINAL.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{instituteforstrategicdialoguendczechia, author = {{Institute for Strategic Dialogue}}, title = {{Czechia: Country Election Risk Assessment}}, institution = {Institute for Strategic Dialogue}, url = {https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/FRT-24_Czechia-Country-Election-Risk-Assessment-CERA_FINAL.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }