Lebanon protests one year on: Outlooks for recovery and change
Summary
The report finds that while the October 2019 movement succeeded in bringing down two governments and increasing public awareness of systemic corruption, the political elite continues to resist fundamental change, leaving the country in a deep recession with a broken citizen-state contract.
Key insights
- Lebanon's financial crisis is the result of four interconnected crises: a highly dollarised economy reliant on external financing, internal weaknesses in the export sector, a deficit in the balance of payments since 2011, and a monetary policy that prioritised high interest rates to attract foreign funds over investing in the real economy.
- The Central Bank and commercial banks operated a "regulated Ponzi scheme" to refinance losses by luring new investors with high interest rates to pay off older ones, leading to a concentration of 25% of national income among 1% of the population.
- The October 2019 movement was distinct from previous protests because it started organically and crossed geographical, religious, and class divides to include socially excluded groups, eventually prompting the resignation of Prime Ministers Saad Hariri and Hassan Diab.
- The August 4, 2020 Beirut seaport blast killed over 200 people, wounded over 6,500, and damaged approximately 40,000 buildings, highlighting institutional negligence and corruption as senior officials reportedly knew of the ammonium nitrate storage for six years.
- COVID-19 exacerbated existing inequalities in Lebanon due to a lack of social safety nets, with a World Food Programme survey from June 2020 showing job losses for over 30% of Lebanese respondents, nearly 40% of Palestinians, and over 50% of Syrian refugees.
- The political elite has maintained power through a 'rentier' economic model based on the politics of apportionment (muhasasa), capturing state assets through public procurement and contracting along sectarian lines.
- Despite the collapse of the post-war economic model, the political elite is attempting to reproduce itself through political concessions and compromises rather than forfeiting control to a more participatory political process.
- Youth political movements associated with the October movement won a sweeping victory in the Lebanese American University (LAU) student council elections in October 2020, winning 14 seats against 16 for traditional parties, signaling a desire for change among youth.
Cite the original document
- APA
- Lehane, C. (2020). Lebanon protests one year on: Outlooks for recovery and change. International Alert. https://www.international-alert.org/stories/lebanon-one-year-on-october-protests/
- Chicago
- Lehane, Colm. Lebanon protests one year on: Outlooks for recovery and change. International Alert, 2020. https://www.international-alert.org/stories/lebanon-one-year-on-october-protests/.
- Wikipedia
- {{cite report |last1=Lehane |first1=Colm |title=Lebanon protests one year on: Outlooks for recovery and change |publisher=International Alert |date=17 October 2020 |url=https://www.international-alert.org/stories/lebanon-one-year-on-october-protests/ |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document intalert-000029)}}
- BibTeX
- @techreport{lehane2020lebanon, author = {Lehane, Colm}, title = {{Lebanon protests one year on: Outlooks for recovery and change}}, institution = {International Alert}, year = {2020}, month = oct, url = {https://www.international-alert.org/stories/lebanon-one-year-on-october-protests/}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document intalert-000029} }
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