Making WTO Membership Work for Least-developed Countries

The document examines the accession of Nepal and Cambodia to the WTO in 2004, highlighting that the process remained strenuous and lacked promised simplifications for LDCs. It finds that both countries made extensive commitments on tariffs and services that often exceeded their developmental capacities. While accession provided a lever for some domestic reform and increased foreign direct investment in Cambodia, implementation of legislative requirements has been slow due to capacity constraints and a lack of monitoring. The brief recommends streamlining accession by removing bilateral market access negotiations for LDCs and linking the implementation of commitments to the receipt of effective technical assistance.

• The WTO accession process for Nepal and Cambodia was not significantly shorter or simpler than for non-LDCs, despite official commitments to streamline procedures. Cambodia's process took approximately 10 years and Nepal's took over eight years, with both countries facing severe capacity constraints in preparing documentation and conducting negotiations.
• Nepal and Cambodia agreed to tariff bindings and market access commitments that were more stringent than those of many other LDCs and some developed nations. Nepal's average bound rate was 26% and Cambodia's was 19%, with both binding nearly all of their tariff lines (99.4% and 100% respectively).
• Cambodia accepted obligations that exceeded standard TRIPS Agreement provisions and LDC norms, such as agreeing to join the International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV) and binding agricultural export subsidies at zero, a requirement not imposed on any other LDC.
• Both countries failed to meet their legislative reform deadlines by the end of 2007. Cambodia adopted only 24 of 47 committed laws and regulations, while Nepal enacted three of 10 new laws and eight of 25 amendments.
• Technical assistance was vital during the negotiation phase but became inadequate after membership, particularly in addressing supply-side constraints. This lack of support hindered the countries' ability to achieve trade diversification and expansion.
• WTO membership had limited direct short-term impacts on trade expansion because both countries already had liberal regimes. However, it served as a signal to investors in Cambodia, contributing to a nearly six-fold increase in foreign direct investment since 2003, though a similar effect was not seen in Nepal.

APA

Baumüller, H., Adhikari, R., & Dahal, N. (2008). Making WTO Membership Work for Least-developed Countries. International Institute for Sustainable Development. https://www.iisd.org/system/files/publications/tkn_making_wto_membership_work.pdf

Chicago

Baumüller, Heike, Ratnakar Adhikari, and Navin Dahal. Making WTO Membership Work for Least-developed Countries. International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2008. https://www.iisd.org/system/files/publications/tkn_making_wto_membership_work.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Baumüller |first1=Heike |last2=Adhikari |first2=Ratnakar |last3=Dahal |first3=Navin |title=Making WTO Membership Work for Least-developed Countries |publisher=International Institute for Sustainable Development |date=September 2008 |url=https://www.iisd.org/system/files/publications/tkn_making_wto_membership_work.pdf |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{baumller2008making, author = {Baumüller, Heike and Adhikari, Ratnakar and Dahal, Navin}, title = {{Making WTO Membership Work for Least-developed Countries}}, institution = {International Institute for Sustainable Development}, year = {2008}, month = sep, url = {https://www.iisd.org/system/files/publications/tkn_making_wto_membership_work.pdf}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }