World Trade Organization Agriculture Negotiations at MC13

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The author argues that for MC13 to be successful, the WTO must move beyond non-binding declarations toward binding commitments. Key proposals include an exemption for least developed countries (LDCs) from food export restrictions to ensure food availability. However, significant disagreements persist between developing nations (such as India and China) and developed nations (including the US and EU) regarding public stockholding and the reduction of trade-distorting domestic support.

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  • Least developed countries (LDCs) are disproportionately affected by food export restrictions, with the share of imported calories affected reaching 29.6% during the 2008 recession, 18.2% during the COVID-19 pandemic, and 26.3% in the early months of the war in Ukraine.
  • A proposed LDC exemption from export prohibitions or restrictions would allow these countries to import food from members that have restricted exports to all others, potentially shielding them from global price rises. However, this would not address the affordability of food for the poorest consumers, a challenge that could be mitigated by the FAO's proposed Global Food Import Financing Facility.
  • There is a fundamental disagreement on public stockholding: developing countries like India and China, and groups like the G-33 and African Group, view it as a stand-alone issue. Conversely, the Cairns Group, the US, and the EU consider public stockholding at administered prices to be a form of trade-distorting domestic support that should be capped and reduced.
  • Developing countries, including India and China, seek to remove aggregate measurement of support entitlements that allow 32 WTO members to provide high levels of trade-distorting support. Additionally, the African Group and Pakistan target 'green box' subsidies, particularly those for cotton, which they argue undercut producers in developing countries.
  • Non-binding declarations, such as the one from MC12, have proven ineffective; despite reaffirming the importance of not imposing export restrictions, 75 such restrictions on food, feed, and fertilizers remained in place as of October 2023.

Cite the original document

APA
Calvo, F. (2024). World Trade Organization Agriculture Negotiations at MC13. International Institute for Sustainable Development. https://www.iisd.org/articles/policy-analysis/wto-food-security-agriculture-negotiations-mc13
Chicago
Calvo, Facundo. World Trade Organization Agriculture Negotiations at MC13. International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2024. https://www.iisd.org/articles/policy-analysis/wto-food-security-agriculture-negotiations-mc13.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Calvo |first1=Facundo |title=World Trade Organization Agriculture Negotiations at MC13 |publisher=International Institute for Sustainable Development |date=12 January 2024 |url=https://www.iisd.org/articles/policy-analysis/wto-food-security-agriculture-negotiations-mc13 |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
BibTeX
@techreport{calvo2024world, author = {Calvo, Facundo}, title = {{World Trade Organization Agriculture Negotiations at MC13}}, institution = {International Institute for Sustainable Development}, year = {2024}, month = jan, url = {https://www.iisd.org/articles/policy-analysis/wto-food-security-agriculture-negotiations-mc13}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }

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