IEEFA Response to Capacity Mechanism High-Level Design Paper

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IEEFA opposes the Energy Security Board's proposed capacity mechanism, arguing it would increase consumer costs and delay decarbonisation by paying existing coal generators. The document instead proposes a reliability bond scheme and managed phase-down agreements to ensure an orderly transition to low-emissions energy.

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  • The Energy Security Board's proposed capacity mechanism is unlikely to solve National Electricity Market challenges because it does not provide certainty regarding coal exits and may discourage new entrants by locking in a high-emissions system.
  • A capacity mechanism that includes payments to all generators, including existing coal plants, could impose substantial costs on consumers, potentially reaching $430 per household per year based on Western Australian experience.
  • IEEFA proposes a 'reliability bond' scheme where operators of ageing plants provide financial surety for the next 42 months of operation, forfeiting the bond if they fail to meet availability requirements or close without sufficient notice.
  • As an alternative to a general capacity mechanism, IEEFA suggests 'managed phase-down agreements' for financially distressed generators, where payments are provided for achieving availability targets until a permanent closure date is reached.
  • The proposed de-rating factors based on 'at-risk' periods are considered flawed because they rely on forecasts that cannot account for random system stress events, such as the market suspension in June 2022.
  • Capacity markets generally favour resources with lower fixed costs and higher operating costs, which typically disadvantages low-carbon resources that have high fixed costs and near-zero operating costs.
  • To effectively incentivise new entrants, any capacity support should be restricted to new, low-emissions, and flexible capacity, potentially using long-term contracts rather than one-year contracts to provide revenue certainty.

Cite the original document

APA
Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (2022). IEEFA Response to Capacity Mechanism High-Level Design Paper. https://ieefa.org/sites/default/files/2022-08/IEEFA%20Response%20to%20Capacity%20Mechanism%20Project%20High-level%20Design%20Paper.pdf
Chicago
Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis. IEEFA Response to Capacity Mechanism High-Level Design Paper. 2022. https://ieefa.org/sites/default/files/2022-08/IEEFA%20Response%20to%20Capacity%20Mechanism%20Project%20High-level%20Design%20Paper.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite press release |author=Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis |title=IEEFA Response to Capacity Mechanism High-Level Design Paper |date=25 July 2022 |url=https://ieefa.org/sites/default/files/2022-08/IEEFA%20Response%20to%20Capacity%20Mechanism%20Project%20High-level%20Design%20Paper.pdf |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document ieefa-001419)}}
BibTeX
@misc{instituteforenergyeconomicsandfinancialanalysis2022ieefa, author = {{Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis}}, title = {{IEEFA Response to Capacity Mechanism High-Level Design Paper}}, publisher = {Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis}, year = {2022}, month = jul, url = {https://ieefa.org/sites/default/files/2022-08/IEEFA%20Response%20to%20Capacity%20Mechanism%20Project%20High-level%20Design%20Paper.pdf}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document ieefa-001419} }

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