Spain: High Cost of Political Interference in Power Markets

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The Spanish government is intervening to prevent the closure of uneconomic power plants, citing security of supply despite having a capacity margin of approximately 30 percent, which is significantly higher than the 10 to 15 percent typically required. This interference, alongside a capacity market that costs nearly €1 billion annually, has created system overcapacity where older coal plants are prioritized over cleaner gas plants. The document highlights that such policies conflict with the coal phase-out trends seen in other European nations and hinder utilities like Iberdrola and Endesa from transitioning toward more profitable renewable energy investments.

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  • The Spanish government's policy to veto the closure of uneconomic power plants is based on security of supply concerns, yet Spain maintains a capacity margin of about 30 percent, far exceeding the 10 to 15 percent margin typically needed by grid operators to manage outages and wind power variability.
  • Political intervention in the Spanish electricity market results in three primary costs: direct annual subsidies of nearly €1 billion for the capacity market, the creation of overcapacity that forces cleaner gas plants to remain idle in favor of polluting coal plants, and the undermining of sound economic decisions by utilities.
  • Spain's combined cycle gas turbines (CCGT) have operated at below 20 percent capacity for five consecutive years, illustrating the inefficiency of using capacity payments to prop up idle generation.
  • Endesa's proposed €400 million investment to extend the life of the Alcudia, Litoral, and AS Pontes coal plants contradicts the coal phase-out trends in the U.K. (by 2025), Portugal and the Netherlands (by 2030), and Italy (proposed 2025/2030).

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APA
Wynn, G. (2017). Spain: High Cost of Political Interference in Power Markets. Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis. https://ieefa.org/resources/ieefa-spain-high-cost-political-interference-power-markets
Chicago
Wynn, Gerard. Spain: High Cost of Political Interference in Power Markets. Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis, 2017. https://ieefa.org/resources/ieefa-spain-high-cost-political-interference-power-markets.
Wikipedia
{{cite press release |last1=Wynn |first1=Gerard |title=Spain: High Cost of Political Interference in Power Markets |publisher=Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis |date=16 November 2017 |url=https://ieefa.org/resources/ieefa-spain-high-cost-political-interference-power-markets |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document ieefa-000842)}}
BibTeX
@misc{wynn2017spain, author = {Wynn, Gerard}, title = {{Spain: High Cost of Political Interference in Power Markets}}, publisher = {Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis}, year = {2017}, month = nov, url = {https://ieefa.org/resources/ieefa-spain-high-cost-political-interference-power-markets}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document ieefa-000842} }

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