Making Russia First Again
Summary
The author argues that Russia has shifted from viewing the EU as a model for modernisation to seeing it as a strategic challenger to its neo-imperialist vision. To counter Western influence and the 'eastward march' of Europe, the Kremlin employs a strategy of 'managing instability' through disinformation, cyberattacks, and the support of far-right political parties in Europe. While Russia seeks bilateral rapprochement with key powers like Germany and France to bypass sanctions and isolate Eastern European 'Russosceptic' countries, the author contends that Moscow's strategic goals remain unfulfilled and that it will continue to exploit Western electoral cycles to foment populism.
Key insights
- Russia's perception of the EU shifted from a model of modernisation to a strategic threat following the 'colour revolutions' in post-Soviet republics and the EU's Eastern Partnership, which Moscow viewed as an attempt to undermine its domination in the post-Soviet sphere.
- The Kremlin employs a strategy of 'managing instability' within Europe by using disinformation, social media tools, and the strengthening of far-right parties to act as 'Trojan horses' in liberal democracies.
- Russia utilizes strategic infrastructure and bilateral diplomacy to maintain influence in key European nations; specifically, the Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines are viewed as geopolitical tools to keep Germany pro-Russia.
- The Russian leadership has integrated specific historical lessons into its current toolkit: the 'CNN effect' led to investment in international broadcasting, the 2007 attack on Estonia demonstrated the efficacy of cheap cyberaggression, and the 2008 Georgian war reinforced a zero-sum view of world politics.
- Russia maintains a network of 'friends' among European politicians who oppose sanctions and liberal values, including Matteo Salvini, Marine Le Pen, Viktor Orbán, and Karin Kneissl.
- Despite tactical successes, Russia has not achieved its primary strategic goals, as it has not restored its G8 membership, the West does not accept the post-Soviet sphere as a Russian buffer zone, and economic sanctions remain in place.
- The author predicts that Russia will attempt to use the 2020 and 2021 elections in the US, France, and Germany to foment populism and will work to marginalise 'Russosceptic' countries such as Poland, Ukraine, and the Baltic states.
Cite the original document
- APA
- Bryc, A. (2020). Making Russia First Again. Green European Journal. https://www.greeneuropeanjournal.eu/making-russia-first-again/
- Chicago
- Bryc, Agnieszka. Making Russia First Again. Green European Journal, 2020. https://www.greeneuropeanjournal.eu/making-russia-first-again/.
- Wikipedia
- {{cite report |last1=Bryc |first1=Agnieszka |title=Making Russia First Again |publisher=Green European Journal |date=27 January 2020 |url=https://www.greeneuropeanjournal.eu/making-russia-first-again/ |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
- BibTeX
- @techreport{bryc2020making, author = {Bryc, Agnieszka}, title = {{Making Russia First Again}}, institution = {Green European Journal}, year = {2020}, month = jan, url = {https://www.greeneuropeanjournal.eu/making-russia-first-again/}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }
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