State of Disinformation: Germany v.FINAL

The document analyzes Germany's disinformation environment, highlighting the role of domestic far-right actors and foreign influence from Russia, China, and Turkey. It examines the shift from the Network Enforcement Act (NetzDG) to the EU Digital Services Act (DSA) and reports a persistent reach of disinformation websites, with 3.6 billion page views from Germany in 2024. Key narrative clusters include election denialism, anti-immigrant hate speech, and climate policy opposition, while foreign operations aim to polarize society and weaken support for Ukraine.

• Germany's media landscape is seeing a decline in trust and a shift toward social media; public trust in media fell from 60 per cent in 2015 to 43 per cent in 2024, while news consumption via social media rose from 18 per cent to 34 per cent between 2013 and 2024.
• Violence against journalists in Germany has increased, with 89 violent cases reported in 2024 compared to 41 in 2023, contributing to a drop in Germany's Reporters Without Borders Index ranking from 10th to 11th place in 2025.
• Germany has transitioned its regulatory approach from the 2017 Network Enforcement Act (NetzDG), which focused on removing illegal content within 24 hours, to the EU's Digital Services Act (DSA) via the Digitale-Dienste-Gesetz (DDG) in May 2024, moving toward a risk-based oversight regime.
• Disinformation websites maintain a significant reach in Germany; in 2024, GDI-flagged domains generated approximately 3.6 billion page views from Germany, averaging 330 million per month.
• Adversarial narratives in Germany are categorized into four main clusters: civic integrity (e.g., claims that Germany is no longer a democracy), hate speech and bigotry (targeting Muslims and LGBTQIA+ people), conspiracy theories (including the Great Replacement), and environmentalism (portraying green policies as harmful to the middle class).
• Russia employs a hybrid warfare strategy in Germany, including the 'Doppelganger' operation which mimics mainstream media to shift support away from Ukraine, and the use of AI-generated content via 'Storm 1516' to erode civic trust.
• China's influence operations in Germany involve 'information laundering' through fake news sites like the 'Paperwall' campaign, as well as the use of elite networking groups and the 'China Reporter' project to cultivate pro-Beijing sentiment in media and academia.
• Turkey leverages its diaspora of over 3 million people of Turkish origin to exert influence, using state-controlled outlets like TRT Deutsch and religious institutions like DITIB for surveillance and the dissemination of narratives that portray Western countries as Islamophobic.

APA

Global Disinformation Index (n.d.). State of Disinformation: Germany v.FINAL. https://www.disinformationindex.org/files/State of Disinformation_Germany_June2025.pdf

Chicago

Global Disinformation Index. State of Disinformation: Germany v.FINAL. n.d. https://www.disinformationindex.org/files/State of Disinformation_Germany_June2025.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |author=Global Disinformation Index |title=State of Disinformation: Germany v.FINAL |url=https://www.disinformationindex.org/files/State of Disinformation_Germany_June2025.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{globaldisinformationindexndstate, author = {{Global Disinformation Index}}, title = {{State of Disinformation: Germany v.FINAL}}, institution = {Global Disinformation Index}, url = {https://www.disinformationindex.org/files/State of Disinformation_Germany_June2025.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }