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The document examines the relationship between business cycles and carbon pricing, noting that emissions are generally pro-cyclical. It argues that because climate damage depends on the stock of accumulated gases rather than annual flow, policy-makers can trade off higher emissions during booms for lower emissions during recessions. The author recommends that carbon pricing be applied to the largest possible group of emitters and that the stringency of regulation—such as the emissions cap or tax rate—be adjusted according to transparent, predictable rules based on economic activity. The brief highlights that developing countries, which experience more volatile and persistent economic fluctuations, stand to gain more from such responsive designs. It compares the EU, South Korea, and California emissions trading systems, concluding that California's rule-based approach most closely aligns with these recommendations.

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  • Economic fluctuations and their impact on emissions differ significantly between advanced and developing economies; developing countries typically experience larger, more persistent, and more volatile GDP and emissions fluctuations.
  • Optimal carbon pricing should be responsive to the business cycle, allowing emissions to be pro-cyclical by relaxing regulations during economic expansions and tightening them during recessions.
  • The ability to trade off annual emissions across different phases of the business cycle is possible because climate change is driven by the total stock of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere rather than the annual flow of emissions.
  • To minimize lobbying and market manipulation, responsiveness mechanisms should be governed by transparent, predictable, and hard-to-manipulate rules, preferably integrated into the system at its inception.
  • Carbon pricing instruments should cover as large a group of emitters as possible to reduce inefficiencies and pool volatile economic shocks, a strategy particularly beneficial for developing countries.
  • A comparison of three emissions trading systems shows that the California system most closely follows the recommendation for rule-based responsiveness, whereas the EU system has historically relied on more discretionary and late adjustments like 'backloading'.

Cite the original document

APA
Doda, B. (2014). How to price carbon in good times… and bad. Global Green Growth Institute. https://gggi.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/2067_GRI_How-to-price-carbon_web_2.pdf
Chicago
Doda, Baran. How to price carbon in good times… and bad. Global Green Growth Institute, 2014. https://gggi.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/2067_GRI_How-to-price-carbon_web_2.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Doda |first1=Baran |title=How to price carbon in good times… and bad |publisher=Global Green Growth Institute |date=December 2014 |url=https://gggi.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/2067_GRI_How-to-price-carbon_web_2.pdf |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document gggi-000157)}}
BibTeX
@techreport{doda2014how, author = {Doda, Baran}, title = {{How to price carbon in good times… and bad}}, institution = {Global Green Growth Institute}, year = {2014}, month = dec, url = {https://gggi.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/2067_GRI_How-to-price-carbon_web_2.pdf}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document gggi-000157} }

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