Lobby group EFILA’s stake in investment arbitration

The document examines EFILA, established in 2014, asserting that its members and board consist of law firms and individuals with direct financial stakes in the investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) system. It highlights how EFILA's policy recommendations to the European Commission regarding the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) oppose meaningful reforms, such as appellate mechanisms or limits on investor rights, to protect the profitability of the arbitration industry. The briefing details specific high-profile cases and the 'revolving door' career of EFILA's general secretary to illustrate the conflict of interest inherent in the group's advocacy.

• EFILA is characterized as a special interest group whose members are exclusively international law firms specializing in investment arbitration or large companies that have used arbitration against states, meaning they have "clear financial motivations for promoting ISDS."
• The financial scale of the investment arbitration industry is significant, with legal costs for ISDS cases averaging over $8 million, and estimates suggest more than 80% of these costs go to the lawyers (counsel).
• EFILA's board members are deeply embedded in the ISDS system; individuals on the executive and advisory boards have participated in at least 100 investor-state arbitration cases as either counsel or arbitrators.
• EFILA's submission to the European Commission's consultation on TTIP opposes reforms that would increase policy space for states, arguing instead for "the highest possible level of investment protection" and the power for tribunals to order states to "repeal the contested measure or modify the underlying law."
• The group advocates for the retention of ambiguous investor rights, such as 'fair and equitable treatment' and the 'MFN-clause', which the document claims allow investors to attack public interest measures and side-step treaty reforms.
• EFILA opposes the creation of an appellate mechanism for ISDS, claiming that the "lack of an appeal mechanism is one of the greatest advantages of arbitration."
• The document cites Nikos Lavranos as an example of the 'revolving door' phenomenon, noting he moved from being a chief representative for the Netherlands in the EU’s Trade Policy Committee to managing EFILA and joining a consultancy that helps investors access 'investor-friendly arbitration routes'.

APA

Flues, F., Vervest, P., Olivet, C., & Eberhardt, P. (2015). Lobby group EFILA’s stake in investment arbitration. Friends of the Earth International. https://www.foei.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/lawyers-subverting-public-interest.pdf

Chicago

Flues, Fabian, Pietje Vervest, Cecilia Olivet, and Pia Eberhardt. Lobby group EFILA’s stake in investment arbitration. Friends of the Earth International, 2015. https://www.foei.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/lawyers-subverting-public-interest.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Flues |first1=Fabian |last2=Vervest |first2=Pietje |last3=Olivet |first3=Cecilia |last4=Eberhardt |first4=Pia |title=Lobby group EFILA’s stake in investment arbitration |publisher=Friends of the Earth International |date=April 2015 |url=https://www.foei.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/lawyers-subverting-public-interest.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{flues2015lobby, author = {Flues, Fabian and Vervest, Pietje and Olivet, Cecilia and Eberhardt, Pia}, title = {{Lobby group EFILA’s stake in investment arbitration}}, institution = {Friends of the Earth International}, year = {2015}, month = apr, url = {https://www.foei.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/lawyers-subverting-public-interest.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }