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The report examines the EIB's operations in the Global South, specifically in Zambia, Chad, Cameroon, Laos, Philippines, Indonesia, Mexico, and Brazil. It contends that the EIB functions as a demand-driven institution that finances high-yield projects for European firms rather than prioritizing social or environmental goals. Key criticisms include a lack of transparency, failure to adhere to EU environmental and social standards, and the promotion of harmful projects such as large dams and extractive industries. The document concludes with recommendations for a fundamental review of the EIB's project selection, accountability, and monitoring processes.

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  • The EIB has evolved into a demand-driven institution that prioritizes high economic returns and the needs of its clients over poverty alleviation or environmental protection.
  • In Latin America and Asia, the EIB interprets 'common interest' as the expansion of European companies' external markets, with over 90% of loans to Latin America since 1993 going to European subsidiaries or large multinationals.
  • EIB lending in Africa is heavily skewed toward the extractive industry, with the Chad-Cameroon pipeline receiving 144 million euros, representing 4% of total loans for the Africa, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) region.
  • The EIB lacks internal safeguard policies for involuntary resettlement or indigenous peoples and does not provide independent grievance mechanisms for affected populations outside Europe.
  • The bank frequently denies public access to project information, including environmental and social impact assessments, citing confidentiality agreements with borrowers.
  • EIB-funded water privatization projects in Indonesia and the Philippines failed to improve access for the poor and instead led to increased tariffs and legal disputes.
  • The EIB classifies large hydroelectric dams as renewable energy despite their significant environmental and social impacts, such as the Nam Theun 2 project in Laos.
  • In Zambia, EIB investments have focused on the extractive sector (approximately 63 million euros since 2000) despite the EU identifying transport and institutional capacity as the country's development priorities.
  • The Veracel pulp plant in Brazil, funded by the EIB, has been linked to land concentration, the displacement of over 800 people, and the clearing of the Atlantic Forest.

Cite the original document

APA
Colajacomo, J. (n.d.). EL BANCO EUROPEO DE INVERSIONES EN EL SUR. Friends of the Earth International. https://www.foei.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/eibenelsur.pdf
Chicago
Colajacomo, Jaroslava. EL BANCO EUROPEO DE INVERSIONES EN EL SUR. Friends of the Earth International, n.d. https://www.foei.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/eibenelsur.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Colajacomo |first1=Jaroslava |title=EL BANCO EUROPEO DE INVERSIONES EN EL SUR |publisher=Friends of the Earth International |url=https://www.foei.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/eibenelsur.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
BibTeX
@techreport{colajacomondbanco, author = {Colajacomo, Jaroslava}, title = {{EL BANCO EUROPEO DE INVERSIONES EN EL SUR}}, institution = {Friends of the Earth International}, url = {https://www.foei.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/eibenelsur.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }

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