The South African government’s Integrated Resource Plan for the electricity industry

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This research paper argues that South Africa's plan to add nuclear capacity is based on flawed cost estimates and unrealistic load factors, suggesting that actual costs could be up to three times higher than expected.

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  • The South African government's decision to add 9,600 MW of nuclear capacity by 2030 was an imposed policy choice rather than a result of the Integrated Resource Planning (IRP) process.
  • The IRP's base case overnight construction cost of $5,800/kW is considered unrealistic, as recent international evidence, such as the Hinkley Point C project at $8,000/kW, suggests significantly higher prices.
  • The IRP assumes a lifetime load factor of 92 per cent, which is described as unprecedented and unrealistic compared to the actual lifetime load factor of the Koeberg reactors, which is less than 70 per cent.
  • The use of a standard real discount rate of 8 per cent for all energy options in the IRP fails to account for the fact that nuclear power is the riskiest commercial generation option.
  • If more realistic assumptions for construction costs, cost of capital, and load factors were applied, the expected cost of power from a new reactor could be two and a half to three times the expected level.
  • The South African government's demand forecasts are acknowledged to be at the high end of the spectrum, creating a risk of over-investment in capacity.
  • There is a significant risk regarding decommissioning funds in South Africa due to the absence of requirements for segregated funds, which could leave future generations to bear the financial burden.
  • None of the current Generation III or III+ nuclear technology options (including those from Areva, Toshiba-Westinghouse, Korea, China, and Russia) are considered 'proven' as none have operating reactors in service yet.

Cite the original document

APA
Thomas, S. (n.d.). The South African government’s Integrated Resource Plan for the electricity industry. Earthlife Africa. https://earthlife.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/2014-02-06-Thomas_Planning_Investment_in_Electricity_Supply1.pdf
Chicago
Thomas, Steve. The South African government’s Integrated Resource Plan for the electricity industry. Earthlife Africa, n.d. https://earthlife.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/2014-02-06-Thomas_Planning_Investment_in_Electricity_Supply1.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Thomas |first1=Steve |title=The South African government’s Integrated Resource Plan for the electricity industry |publisher=Earthlife Africa |url=https://earthlife.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/2014-02-06-Thomas_Planning_Investment_in_Electricity_Supply1.pdf |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document earthli-000012)}}
BibTeX
@techreport{thomasndsouth, author = {Thomas, Steve}, title = {{The South African government’s Integrated Resource Plan for the electricity industry}}, institution = {Earthlife Africa}, url = {https://earthlife.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/2014-02-06-Thomas_Planning_Investment_in_Electricity_Supply1.pdf}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document earthli-000012} }

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