Maximising the investment power of the EU ETS
Summary
This briefing proposes transforming the EU ETS from a simple carbon pricing mechanism into an industrial transformation engine by linking revenues and carbon-leakage support directly to decarbonisation investments. Its central finding is that a carbon price alone cannot bridge the investment gap for clean industrial production at politically realistic levels.
Key insights
- The carbon price alone is insufficient to close the 'green premium' for clean industrial production at politically realistic levels; for example, cost gaps for primary steel via hydrogen-based direct reduction of iron are estimated at €100–250/tCO2.
- The EU ETS has not yet mobilised industrial transformation at the required speed and scale, with 90% of industrial emissions still covered by free allowances, resulting in an average effective carbon cost for at-risk industries of less than €2/tCO₂ between 2021 and 2024.
- Member State use of ETS revenues is poorly aligned with industrial decarbonisation; in 2024, only €0.8 billion (3.3% of total Member State revenues) was allocated to industrial decarbonisation.
- Indirect Cost Compensation (ICC) often fails to trigger investment; a Finnish case study showed ICC led only to an increase in electricity purchased by subsidised plants rather than competitiveness benefits.
- The proposed Industrial Decarbonisation Bank (IDB) should act as a deployment vehicle for projects where the gap between the carbon price and clean production costs blocks final investment decisions, complementing the Innovation Fund's focus on first-of-a-kind technologies.
- Free allocation should be transitioned from a passive protection tool to a conditional bridge by linking it to Climate Transition Plans, verified investment, and a 'bonus-malus' system that penalises laggards and rewards first movers.
- Three primary pressures threaten the ETS's investment power: calls to lower the carbon price (which weakens the signal and revenue base), pressure to expand carbon-leakage support, and the diversion of auction revenues to wider EU budget needs, such as repaying NextGenerationEU debt.
Cite the original document
- APA
- Cătuţi, M., Waliszewska, A., & Vangenechten, D. (2026). Maximising the investment power of the EU ETS. E3G. https://www.e3g.org/wp-content/uploads/E3G-briefing-Maximising-the-investment-power-of-the-EU-ETS.pdf
- Chicago
- Cătuţi, Mihnea, Aleksandra Waliszewska, and Domien Vangenechten. Maximising the investment power of the EU ETS. E3G, 2026. https://www.e3g.org/wp-content/uploads/E3G-briefing-Maximising-the-investment-power-of-the-EU-ETS.pdf.
- Wikipedia
- {{cite report |last1=Cătuţi |first1=Mihnea |last2=Waliszewska |first2=Aleksandra |last3=Vangenechten |first3=Domien |title=Maximising the investment power of the EU ETS |publisher=E3G |date=June 2026 |url=https://www.e3g.org/wp-content/uploads/E3G-briefing-Maximising-the-investment-power-of-the-EU-ETS.pdf |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document e3g-000871)}}
- BibTeX
- @techreport{ctui2026maximising, author = {Cătuţi, Mihnea and Waliszewska, Aleksandra and Vangenechten, Domien}, title = {{Maximising the investment power of the EU ETS}}, institution = {E3G}, year = {2026}, month = jun, url = {https://www.e3g.org/wp-content/uploads/E3G-briefing-Maximising-the-investment-power-of-the-EU-ETS.pdf}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document e3g-000871} }
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