Responsibly Deploying Export Controls as Part of the Solution

The document argues that while current US export controls focus on the physical synthesis of pathogens, the rise of AI-enabled Biological Design Tools (BDTs) and Large Language Models (LLMs) creates a gap in the 'design' phase of pathogen creation. It recommends that the US Department of Commerce amend the Commerce Control List to restrict software capable of designing controlled biological agents and de novo pathogens with equivalent virulence. The author suggests narrowing the 'publicly available' carve-out to prevent the open-sourcing of high-risk BDTs and calls for international harmonization through the Australia Group. The brief also identifies challenges in current Export Administration Regulations (EAR), such as the 'specially designed' terminology and the Fundamental Research Exclusion, which could create loopholes for dual-use AI software developed in academic settings.

• Current US export controls on biological materials focus primarily on the 'digital to physical' interface, specifically software that operates nucleic acid assemblers and synthesizers, leaving a gap in the design phase of pathogen creation.
• AI-enabled Biological Design Tools (BDTs) and Large Language Models (LLMs) could lower the barriers to creating dangerous pathogens by providing detailed instructions for amateur researchers or enabling the design of novel genetic sequences.
• The 'specially designed' terminology in the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) may be insufficient for regulating AI tools, as it might exclude dual-use software where weaponization was not the original design intent.
• The Fundamental Research Exclusion (FRE) could act as a loophole for the proliferation of Bio-AI risks because many BDTs are developed in open academic settings.
• The author recommends that the US Department of Commerce amend the Commerce Control List to include software used for the design of controlled biological agents and those capable of designing de novo pathogens with virulence equivalent to those listed in ECCN 1C351.
• To prevent the proliferation of high-risk AI software, the US should create a narrow carve-out to the 'publicly available' exclusion to limit the open-sourcing of the riskiest BDTs.

APA

The Council on Strategic Risks (2024). Responsibly Deploying Export Controls as Part of the Solution. https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/2024/07/12/advances-in-ai-and-increased-biological-risks/

Chicago

The Council on Strategic Risks. Responsibly Deploying Export Controls as Part of the Solution. 2024. https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/2024/07/12/advances-in-ai-and-increased-biological-risks/.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |author=The Council on Strategic Risks |title=Responsibly Deploying Export Controls as Part of the Solution |date=12 July 2024 |url=https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/2024/07/12/advances-in-ai-and-increased-biological-risks/ |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{thecouncilonstrategicrisks2024responsibly, author = {{The Council on Strategic Risks}}, title = {{Responsibly Deploying Export Controls as Part of the Solution}}, institution = {The Council on Strategic Risks}, year = {2024}, month = jul, url = {https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/2024/07/12/advances-in-ai-and-increased-biological-risks/}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }