Membiayai Penghentian Batu Bara

The report examines 'coal transition credits' (CTC)—carbon credits generated by retiring coal plants early and replacing them with renewables—as a way to fund the energy transition in Southeast Asia. Based on a survey of 10 experts, the document finds deep skepticism regarding the instrument's effectiveness. Key concerns include 'carbon leakage' (where retired capacity is replaced by other fossil fuels), the subjectivity of baseline scenarios leading to over-issuance, and the risk of 'greenwashing' or rewarding polluters. Experts highlight that only 2 out of 10 view CTCs as effective, warning that without strict safeguards, these credits could undermine genuine decarbonization and fail to provide a 'just transition' for affected workers and communities.

• Expert confidence in coal transition credits is very low, with only 2 out of 10 surveyed experts considering them an effective instrument for accelerating the coal phase-out in Southeast Asia.
• Carbon leakage is identified as the most dominant environmental integrity risk, particularly in coal-dependent countries like Indonesia, where retiring one plant may simply shift electricity production to other coal or gas facilities.
• The determination of baseline scenarios is highly subjective and uncertain, creating a significant risk of over-issuing credits by inflating emission reduction claims.
• Current methodologies, including Verra's VM0052, are criticized for excluding 'captive' coal plants (those supplying specific industries like nickel or steel), which allows new coal capacity to be built while old plants are retired for credits.
• There is a systemic risk that these credits reverse the 'polluter pays' principle by rewarding asset owners for stopping pollution rather than holding them accountable.
• The potential for a 'just transition' is viewed as conditional and uncertain; experts warn that funds for worker retraining and community support are often treated as costs to be minimized.
• Market demand for these credits is highly uncertain, with 7 out of 10 experts unsure if high buyer demand will materialize, potentially leading to market instability or price crashes similar to the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).
• Structural conflicts of interest exist within the carbon market, as standard-setting bodies earn revenue from credit issuance and third-party auditors are paid by project developers.
• In Southeast Asia, the young average age of coal plants (under 15 years) and rigid Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) make early retirement financially complex and costly, with estimated compensation costs in Indonesia alone reaching $37 billion.

APA

Wyburd, I., & Pavia, E. (2025). Membiayai Penghentian Batu Bara. Carbon Market Watch. https://carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/ID_Financing-the-coal-exit_final.pdf

Chicago

Wyburd, Inigo, and Edoardo Pavia. Membiayai Penghentian Batu Bara. Carbon Market Watch, 2025. https://carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/ID_Financing-the-coal-exit_final.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Wyburd |first1=Inigo |last2=Pavia |first2=Edoardo |title=Membiayai Penghentian Batu Bara |publisher=Carbon Market Watch |date=October 2025 |url=https://carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/ID_Financing-the-coal-exit_final.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{wyburd2025membiayai, author = {Wyburd, Inigo and Pavia, Edoardo}, title = {{Membiayai Penghentian Batu Bara}}, institution = {Carbon Market Watch}, year = {2025}, month = oct, url = {https://carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/ID_Financing-the-coal-exit_final.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }