Is There Room for Compromise?

The document analyzes the institutional conflict regarding climate finance management, contrasting the 'Coordination Camp' (preferring existing institutions) with the 'Consolidation Camp' (seeking a new UN-managed entity). It proposes the Extended Reformed Financial Mechanism (RFM+) as a compromise that combines consolidated disbursement to national entities with the retention of specific international funding bodies like the GEF and Adaptation Fund. The author argues that for such a system to succeed, it must address distributive justice and thematic balance through innovative financing instruments to ensure sufficient revenue.

• The debate on climate finance institutional arrangements is split between a 'Coordination Camp', primarily from developed countries, which favors enhancing existing institutions, and a 'Consolidation Camp', primarily from developing countries, which seeks to consolidate funding under the UNFCCC financial mechanism via a new operating entity.
• Climate finance differs from traditional Official Development Assistance (ODA) because it is viewed as a matter of restitution, creating specific obligations to pay and entitlements to receive based on distributive justice.
• The Climate Registry model represents a 'fragmented, decentralized and retained system' where an Operating Body oversees thematic boards to match developing country needs with available resources, though it may struggle to ensure distributive justice without the power to mandate payments.
• The Reformed Financial Mechanism (RFM) proposes consolidating funding at international and national levels, devolving funding decisions to national Designated Funding Entities (DFEs) to protect national sovereignty and avoid duplicating international certification processes.
• The proposed RFM+ (Extended Reformed Financial Mechanism) acts as a 'Grand Compromise' by retaining the Adaptation Fund Board and a reformed Global Environment Facility (GEF) as additional operating entities for international funding, while using an Executive Board to provide oversight and guidance.
• To avoid a 'Catch 22' where developed countries withhold funds due to lack of faith in a new mechanism, the author suggests using innovative financial instruments to raise revenue, such as an International Air Passenger Adaptation Levy (IAPAL), auctioned emission allowances, or a levy on international financial market transactions.

APA

Müller, B. (2009). Is There Room for Compromise? Climate Strategies. https://climatestrategies.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/oies-rfm-comment-final.pdf

Chicago

Müller, Benito. Is There Room for Compromise? Climate Strategies, 2009. https://climatestrategies.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/oies-rfm-comment-final.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Müller |first1=Benito |title=Is There Room for Compromise? |publisher=Climate Strategies |date=October 2009 |url=https://climatestrategies.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/oies-rfm-comment-final.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{mller2009there, author = {Müller, Benito}, title = {{Is There Room for Compromise?}}, institution = {Climate Strategies}, year = {2009}, month = oct, url = {https://climatestrategies.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/oies-rfm-comment-final.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }