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The document examines why border adjustment (BA) measures are largely absent from Japanese climate policy despite concerns over international competitiveness. It finds that Japan's reliance on voluntary emission reduction plans is inconsistent with BA, and stakeholders view such measures as technically infeasible and incompatible with WTO rules. Instead, Japan advocates for multilateral agreements that include emission commitments for major emerging economies to address carbon leakage.

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  • Japanese climate policy has historically relied on voluntary measures, such as the Keidanren Voluntary Action Plan, which are viewed as inconsistent with the implementation of border adjustment measures.
  • Stakeholders in Japan generally hold a negative view of border adjustment measures, citing three primary barriers: environmental effectiveness, consistency with WTO rules, and technical feasibility.
  • Carbon leakage concerns in Japan are sector-specific, with energy-intensive industries like steel and ceramics being the most vulnerable to increased energy costs from carbon pricing.
  • Japanese industry perceives the Kyoto Protocol's commitments as unfair because competitors in the United States and China did not face similar obligations, leading them to focus frustration on the international institutional architecture rather than specifically on developing countries.
  • Japan's strategic position in international negotiations is to insist on emission mitigation commitments for major emitting developing countries as a more effective alternative to unilateral border adjustments.
  • The domestic emissions trading scheme introduced in October 2008 was viewed by interviewees as a failure due to its voluntary nature and lack of mandatory targets.
  • Decision-making on climate change in Japan shifted around 2007-2008 toward greater involvement of political leaders and the Prime Minister's office, moving away from a process dominated solely by ministries like METI and MOE.

Cite the original document

APA
Climate Strategies (n.d.). #7_CS_JAPAN_Working Paper_draft. https://climatestrategies.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/7-cs-japan-working-paper-draft.pdf
Chicago
Climate Strategies. #7_CS_JAPAN_Working Paper_draft. n.d. https://climatestrategies.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/7-cs-japan-working-paper-draft.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |author=Climate Strategies |title=#7_CS_JAPAN_Working Paper_draft |url=https://climatestrategies.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/7-cs-japan-working-paper-draft.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
BibTeX
@techreport{climatestrategiesnd7csjapanworking, author = {{Climate Strategies}}, title = {{\#7\_CS\_JAPAN\_Working Paper\_draft}}, institution = {Climate Strategies}, url = {https://climatestrategies.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/7-cs-japan-working-paper-draft.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }

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