The Missing 60%: What can investors do to secure improved climate voting by asset managers?

The document addresses the 'Missing 60%'—the discrepancy where asset managers support climate disclosure resolutions at companies like BP and Shell but oppose similar resolutions at US companies like Exxon and Chevron. It argues that trustees can use contractual mandates, the UK Stewardship Code, and the UNPRI to secure greater transparency and control over how their shares are voted. Specific recommendations include adding clauses to mandates for advance disclosure of voting intentions, utilizing Statements of Investment Principles (SIP) for segregated accounts, and challenging managers on conflicts of interest related to their own pension business.

• A significant discrepancy exists in shareholder voting on climate resilience disclosures: while resolutions supported by management at BP, Shell, Statoil, Anglo American, Rio Tinto, and Glencore saw near unanimous support, similar resolutions opposed by management at Exxon and Chevron received only around 40% support, suggesting that 60% of shareholders simply 'rubber stamped' management recommendations.
• Trustees can increase their legal leverage by adding specific clauses to written mandates that require asset managers to disclose voting intentions for particular issues at specific AGMs in advance, as well as providing justifications for voting decisions after the event.
• For UK pension funds with investments in segregated accounts, asset managers are legally required to exercise investment powers to give effect to the fund's Statement of Investment Principles (SIP), meaning managers must follow the SIP's voting policy 'so far as reasonably practicable'.
• Asset managers may face conflicts of interest when they manage assets for the pension funds of the companies in which they are voting, which can lead to a tendency to support company management to avoid losing business.
• Trustees can use the UN Principles of Responsible Investment (UNPRI) to challenge asset managers, as a failure to support climate change disclosure resolutions may constitute a failure to comply with UNPRI Principle 3, which requires seeking appropriate disclosure on ESG issues.
• The transition of the Local Government Pension Scheme (LGPS) into eight 'pools' provides an opportunity for greater voting accountability due to the increased commercial weight of the pools when negotiating mandates and their higher likelihood of using segregated accounts.

APA

ClientEarth (2016). The Missing 60%: What can investors do to secure improved climate voting by asset managers? https://www.clientearth.org/media/fntl4fs3/the-missing-60-what-can-investors-do-to-secure-improved-climate-voting-by-asset-managers-ce-en.pdf

Chicago

ClientEarth. The Missing 60%: What can investors do to secure improved climate voting by asset managers? 2016. https://www.clientearth.org/media/fntl4fs3/the-missing-60-what-can-investors-do-to-secure-improved-climate-voting-by-asset-managers-ce-en.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |author=ClientEarth |title=The Missing 60%: What can investors do to secure improved climate voting by asset managers? |date=November 2016 |url=https://www.clientearth.org/media/fntl4fs3/the-missing-60-what-can-investors-do-to-secure-improved-climate-voting-by-asset-managers-ce-en.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{clientearth2016missing, author = {{ClientEarth}}, title = {{The Missing 60\%: What can investors do to secure improved climate voting by asset managers?}}, institution = {ClientEarth}, year = {2016}, month = nov, url = {https://www.clientearth.org/media/fntl4fs3/the-missing-60-what-can-investors-do-to-secure-improved-climate-voting-by-asset-managers-ce-en.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }