EEZ Fisheries Access Arrangements and the WTO Subsidies Agreement

The report examines the intersection of fisheries access agreements and WTO subsidy law, arguing that while the agreements themselves are not subsidies, the onward transfer of access rights from a Distant Water Fishing Nation (DWFN) to its fleet can constitute a subsidy if the fleet does not pay adequate remuneration. It highlights the negative environmental and social impacts of subsidized distant-water fishing in developing nations and proposes several regulatory options for the WTO, including clarifying the definition of access-related subsidies, introducing transparency requirements, and establishing conditional exceptions for Small Island Developing States (SIDS).

• Fisheries access arrangements, which typically involve government-to-government payments for access to a developing country's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), often result in the host country receiving only a small fraction of the resource's actual value, estimated at 5%-10% in the South West Indian Ocean and the Western and Pacific Ocean.
• Subsidized distant-water fishing has led to the transfer of overcapacity from developed nations to developing waters, contributing to the depletion of stocks and the discarding of bycatch to maximize output, as seen in case studies from Senegal and Argentina.
• Under the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM), the transfer of foreign EEZ access rights by a DWFN to its fleet constitutes a 'financial contribution' because fish are considered 'goods' similar to standing timber in the US – Softwood Lumber IV case.
• A 'benefit' is conferred under the ASCM when a DWFN provides these access rights to its fishing industry for free or for insufficient payment relative to a market benchmark.
• The report concludes that while access agreements per se do not breach SCM Agreement rules, the specific practice of onward transfer of rights can be a subsidy, though this requires case-by-case analysis.
• To improve WTO disciplines, the report suggests explicitly defining 'access-related subsidies' to cover situations where a government provides access to fish under third-state jurisdiction and fails to recover the value from its nationals.
• The report proposes an exception to subsidy prohibitions for access-related subsidies that meet specific criteria, including mandatory notification of financial terms, enforcement of sustainable exploitation laws, and programs for local capacity-building and technology transfer.
• A 'sunset clause' is suggested for exceptions to subsidy prohibitions, which would expire after a set period (e.g., 20 years) to encourage developing coastal states to build their own capacity to exploit marine resources.

APA

Orellana, M. A. (2007). EEZ Fisheries Access Arrangements and the WTO Subsidies Agreement. Center for International Environmental Law. https://www.ciel.org/Publications/UNEP_Fisheries_Dec07.pdf

Chicago

Orellana, Marcos A. EEZ Fisheries Access Arrangements and the WTO Subsidies Agreement. Center for International Environmental Law, 2007. https://www.ciel.org/Publications/UNEP_Fisheries_Dec07.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Orellana |first1=Marcos A. |title=EEZ Fisheries Access Arrangements and the WTO Subsidies Agreement |publisher=Center for International Environmental Law |date=December 2007 |url=https://www.ciel.org/Publications/UNEP_Fisheries_Dec07.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{orellana2007eez, author = {Orellana, Marcos A.}, title = {{EEZ Fisheries Access Arrangements and the WTO Subsidies Agreement}}, institution = {Center for International Environmental Law}, year = {2007}, month = dec, url = {https://www.ciel.org/Publications/UNEP_Fisheries_Dec07.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }