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This research paper proposes a 'combined strategy' to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by integrating international marketable permits, emissions fees, and country commitments. The author argues that while industrial countries are the primary source of emissions, a successful global regime must balance the economic stability of industrial nations with the development needs and fairness concerns of developing countries.

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  • The author proposes a 'combined strategy' consisting of an emissions control mechanism and a financial mechanism. The control mechanism utilizes international marketable permits that start based on historical emissions and converge exponentially to an equal per capita distribution, alongside country commitments to use 'best available control technology' for non-quantifiable sources and to phase out deforestation.
  • The proposed financial mechanism includes two distinct funds: an Abatement Fund and a Damage Fund. The Abatement Fund, financed by unallocated permits, provides grants and concessional loans for technology transfers to developing countries. The Damage Fund, financed by sliding-scale emissions fees, covers 'external' costs such as repairing global warming damage and insuring vulnerable states, adhering to the 'polluter pays principle'.
  • Marketable permits are preferred over emissions fees for primary GHG reduction because they allow regulators to specify a safe level of emissions based on scientific understanding, whereas fees only allow regulators to guess the resulting level of reduction.
  • The author argues that a transition from historical-based permit allocations to per capita allocations serves as a fairness compromise. It allows industrial countries time to adjust their economies while providing developing countries with a net resource transfer, as they could sell excess permits to acquire efficient technology.
  • To address potential permit shortfalls predicted after 2010, the author suggests 'creating' additional permits through afforestation. It is estimated that planting approximately eight million hectares of new forest per year starting around 2007 could offset the deficit, as sixteen million hectares of new forest sequester about 0.1 Gt of carbon annually.
  • The author identifies significant implementation challenges, including the need for cross-border verification of international trades to prevent emission increases in countries with weak monitoring, and the need for trusted international institutions to allocate permits and handle violations.

Cite the original document

APA
Center for International Environmental Law (n.d.). reducing_ghg_1993-06bb0235f061de93.pdf. https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Reducing_GHG_1993.pdf
Chicago
Center for International Environmental Law. reducing_ghg_1993-06bb0235f061de93.pdf. n.d. https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Reducing_GHG_1993.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |author=Center for International Environmental Law |title=reducing_ghg_1993-06bb0235f061de93.pdf |url=https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Reducing_GHG_1993.pdf |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
BibTeX
@techreport{centerforinternationalenvironmentallawndreducingghg199306bb0235f061de93pdf, author = {{Center for International Environmental Law}}, title = {{reducing\_ghg\_1993-06bb0235f061de93.pdf}}, institution = {Center for International Environmental Law}, url = {https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Reducing_GHG_1993.pdf}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }

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