Breaking the Deadlock: Why and How Voting Can Advance the Climate Negotiations 30 Years On

The report examines how the UNFCCC's reliance on consensus has led to a 'race to the bottom,' where a small number of countries can veto critical decisions on fossil fuels, 1.5°C targets, and loss and damage. By comparing the UNFCCC to other UN bodies and multilateral environmental agreements—such as the UN General Assembly and the Montreal Protocol—the author demonstrates that voting mechanisms can actually enhance multilateralism by brokering consensus and exposing blockers. The document proposes two primary procedural pathways for reform: adopting the long-bracketed draft rules of procedure or amending the Convention and Paris Agreement via a three-fourths majority vote.

• The UNFCCC's reliance on consensus-based decision-making often results in 'lowest common denominator outcomes' and allows a small minority of Parties to 'hold the negotiations hostage,' leading to a stalemate and less ambitious decisions.
• Consensus requirements have specifically hindered progress on critical issues, such as the 28-year delay in recognizing the need to move away from fossil fuels and the watering down of coal 'phase out' to 'phase down' at COP26 due to objections from a few countries.
• The report identifies a similar 'weaponization of consensus' in the negotiations for a global plastics treaty (INC), where oil-producing countries have blocked the adoption of a treaty that would regulate plastic production or toxic components despite provisional rules allowing for two-thirds majority voting.
• Voting mechanisms are presented as tools to enhance multilateralism by inducing blockers to negotiate, overcoming minority vetoes, allowing the global majority to advance ambition, and transparently exposing Parties that block progress.
• The International Court of Justice (ICJ) in its July 2025 Advisory Opinion stated that international cooperation on climate change is a 'legal obligation,' implying that States must ensure existing treaties and their implementation are 'fit for purpose.'
• There are two main procedural pathways to introduce voting in the UNFCCC: adopting the draft rules of procedure (which include voting options but have remained bracketed for decades) or amending the Convention and Paris Agreement, which requires a three-fourths majority vote.

APA

Center for International Environmental Law (2025). Breaking the Deadlock: Why and How Voting Can Advance the Climate Negotiations 30 Years On. https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/Decision-Making-Primes_Breaking-the-Deadlock_-Why-and-How-Voting-Can-Advance-the-Climate-Negotiations-30-Years-On_November-2025.pdf

Chicago

Center for International Environmental Law. Breaking the Deadlock: Why and How Voting Can Advance the Climate Negotiations 30 Years On. 2025. https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/Decision-Making-Primes_Breaking-the-Deadlock_-Why-and-How-Voting-Can-Advance-the-Climate-Negotiations-30-Years-On_November-2025.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |author=Center for International Environmental Law |title=Breaking the Deadlock: Why and How Voting Can Advance the Climate Negotiations 30 Years On |date=November 2025 |url=https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/Decision-Making-Primes_Breaking-the-Deadlock_-Why-and-How-Voting-Can-Advance-the-Climate-Negotiations-30-Years-On_November-2025.pdf |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{centerforinternationalenvironmentallaw2025breaking, author = {{Center for International Environmental Law}}, title = {{Breaking the Deadlock: Why and How Voting Can Advance the Climate Negotiations 30 Years On}}, institution = {Center for International Environmental Law}, year = {2025}, month = nov, url = {https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/Decision-Making-Primes_Breaking-the-Deadlock_-Why-and-How-Voting-Can-Advance-the-Climate-Negotiations-30-Years-On_November-2025.pdf}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }