EU PROPOSAL FOR A MULTILATERAL REFORM OF INVESTMENT DISPUTE RESOLUTION

Report an error

Summary

AI-generated

This summary is written by a language model reading the source document. It is not the publisher's words and is not a substitute for the original.

Learn more about AI enrichment

CIEL opposes the EU's proposal for a Multilateral Investment Court (MIC), arguing that it merely improves the institutional aspects of dispute resolution without addressing the substantive treaty provisions that prioritize investor rights over the public interest. The document asserts that an MIC would entrench the flawed investor-state arbitration regime, potentially chilling government regulation on environment and health. CIEL recommends alternatives such as requiring the exhaustion of domestic remedies, limiting jurisdiction to uncompensated direct expropriation, and exploring the complete removal of investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) in favor of state-state consultations or strengthened domestic courts.

Key insights

AI-generated

These insights are written by a language model reading the source document. They are not the publisher's words and are not a substitute for the original.

Learn more about AI enrichment
  • CIEL argues that the MIC would fail to address the core legitimacy crisis of investment arbitration because it does not reform broad investor rights, such as 'fair and equitable treatment', nor does it impose enforceable obligations on investors regarding human rights, labor, or environmental laws.
  • The document highlights that investment arbitration frequently targets public interest policies, noting that over half of more than 200 pending investor-state cases relate to energy and natural resources, which can 'chill' the creation of future public welfare policies.
  • The proposed MIC is criticized for reinforcing a structural bias in favor of international investors by excluding the participation of civil society, communities, and trade unions, and by not requiring investors to exhaust domestic remedies first.
  • CIEL warns that the MIC could lead to the 'consistency of bad law' by formalizing expansive interpretations of investor rights and increasing the authority of awards, thereby further limiting the sovereign right of states to regulate.
  • The document suggests several alternatives to the MIC, including refusing jurisdiction to investors who violate domestic or international laws, limiting claims to uncompensated direct expropriation of real property, and adopting the Brazilian Cooperation and Investment Facilitation Agreement (CIFA) model which excludes ISDS entirely.

Cite the original document

APA
Center for International Environmental Law (2017). EU PROPOSAL FOR A MULTILATERAL REFORM OF INVESTMENT DISPUTE RESOLUTION. https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/CIEL_Position_Paper_on_the_EU_proposal_for_MIC_march_15.pdf
Chicago
Center for International Environmental Law. EU PROPOSAL FOR A MULTILATERAL REFORM OF INVESTMENT DISPUTE RESOLUTION. 2017. https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/CIEL_Position_Paper_on_the_EU_proposal_for_MIC_march_15.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite press release |author=Center for International Environmental Law |title=EU PROPOSAL FOR A MULTILATERAL REFORM OF INVESTMENT DISPUTE RESOLUTION |date=15 March 2017 |url=https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/CIEL_Position_Paper_on_the_EU_proposal_for_MIC_march_15.pdf |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
BibTeX
@misc{centerforinternationalenvironmentallaw2017proposal, author = {{Center for International Environmental Law}}, title = {{EU PROPOSAL FOR A MULTILATERAL REFORM OF INVESTMENT DISPUTE RESOLUTION}}, publisher = {Center for International Environmental Law}, year = {2017}, month = mar, url = {https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/CIEL_Position_Paper_on_the_EU_proposal_for_MIC_march_15.pdf}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }

Full text

Collected · Record updated