Non-Party Trade Provisions in Multilateral Environmental Agreements

This briefing by the Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL) examines the role of non-party trade provisions in Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) to provide guidance for the development of a future international treaty to end plastic pollution. It argues that trade restrictions on non-parties are essential to incentivize ratification, prevent 'free-riding', and ensure the overall effectiveness of environmental treaties.

• Non-party trade provisions are used in MEAs to incentivize states to join a treaty and to prevent non-parties from benefiting from environmental gains without making similar commitments, a practice known as 'free-riding'.
• The Montreal Protocol is cited as a primary example of the success of non-party trade provisions; by precluding parties from trading controlled substances with non-parties, it became the first international environmental treaty to achieve universal ratification with 196 Parties.
• Trade bans or restrictions with non-parties prevent parties from circumventing treaty obligations and discourage non-parties from increasing production of banned materials, which would otherwise damage the competitiveness of signatory industries.
• Different MEAs employ varying levels of strictness regarding non-party trade. For example, the Basel Convention generally prohibits the export and import of covered wastes between parties and non-parties, while CITES allows trade if the non-party provides 'comparable documentation' that substantially conforms to treaty requirements.
• World Trade Organization (WTO) rules and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) do not prohibit non-party trade provisions in MEAs, provided that these provisions mirror the trade measures applicable between parties to avoid being seen as discriminatory or protectionist.
• For the future plastics treaty, CIEL recommends that if production bans or phaseouts are established for polymers or additives, there should be corresponding trade restrictions with non-parties. They further suggest considering a complete prohibition of imports of plastic precursors, materials, products, and wastes from any non-party State.
• To ensure compliance and close loopholes, CIEL argues that the treaty Secretariat must have the authority to control the implementation of party-to-non-party provisions, noting that the CITES Secretariat's level of control is a strength that the Basel Convention lacks.

APA

de Anzizu, H. (2023). Non-Party Trade Provisions in Multilateral Environmental Agreements. Center for International Environmental Law. https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/CIEL_brief_Non-Party-Trade-Provisions-in-meas_April-2023.pdf

Chicago

de Anzizu, Helionor. Non-Party Trade Provisions in Multilateral Environmental Agreements. Center for International Environmental Law, 2023. https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/CIEL_brief_Non-Party-Trade-Provisions-in-meas_April-2023.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=de Anzizu |first1=Helionor |title=Non-Party Trade Provisions in Multilateral Environmental Agreements |publisher=Center for International Environmental Law |date=April 2023 |url=https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/CIEL_brief_Non-Party-Trade-Provisions-in-meas_April-2023.pdf |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{deanzizu2023nonparty, author = {de Anzizu, Helionor}, title = {{Non-Party Trade Provisions in Multilateral Environmental Agreements}}, institution = {Center for International Environmental Law}, year = {2023}, month = apr, url = {https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/CIEL_brief_Non-Party-Trade-Provisions-in-meas_April-2023.pdf}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }